Editing Intelligence assessment (section)

== Intelligence information cycle theory around the world ==
{{Main|Intelligence cycle}}

=== United States Intelligence Community ===
The [[United States Intelligence Community|U.S. intelligence community]] (IC) follows a structured six-step intelligence cycle;<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |title=The intelligence cycle |url=https://www.cia.gov/spy-kids/static/59d238b4b5f69e0497325e49f0769acf/Briefing-intelligence-cycle.pdf |access-date=March 5, 2025 |website=CIA SpyKids}}</ref>

* [[Intelligence collection plan|Planning & Direction]]<ref name=":5" />
* [[Espionage|Collection (Espionage)]]<ref name=":5" />
* Processing & Exploitation<ref name=":5" />
* [[Intelligence analysis|Analysis & Production]]<ref name=":5" />
* [[Intelligence dissemination management|Dissemination]], and Feedback.<ref name=":5" />

The IC has a heavy reliance on technological collection ([[Signals intelligence|SIGINT]], [[Imagery intelligence|IMINT]], [[Measurement and signature intelligence|MASINT]]) alongside [[Human intelligence (intelligence gathering)|HUMINT]].<ref name=":0" />

Centralized analysis through agencies like the CIA, DIA, and NSA, but intelligence dissemination is highly structured through national security briefings.<ref name=":1" />

The Intelligence Information Cycle leverages secrecy theory and U.S. regulation of classified intelligence to re-conceptualize the traditional intelligence cycle under the following four assumptions:

# Intelligence is secret information
# Intelligence is a public good
# Intelligence moves cyclically
# Intelligence is hoarded

Information is transformed from privately held to secretly held to public based on who has control over it. For example, the [[privacy|private information]] of a source becomes secret information (intelligence) when control over its dissemination is shared with an intelligence officer, and then becomes public information when the intelligence officer further disseminates it to the public by any number of means, including formal reporting, threat warning, and others. The fourth assumption, intelligence is hoarded, causes conflict points where information transitions from one type to another. The first conflict point, collection, occurs when private transitions to secret information (intelligence). The second conflict point, dissemination, occurs when secret transitions to public information. Thus, conceiving of intelligence using these assumptions demonstrates the cause of collection techniques (to ease the private-secret transition) and dissemination conflicts, and can inform ethical standards of conduct among all agents in the intelligence process.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Stottlemyre |first=Steven |date=2022 |title=Reconceptualizing Intelligence after Benghazi |url=https://rgdoi.net/10.13140/RG.2.2.19732.99204 |language=en |doi=10.13140/RG.2.2.19732.99204}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Stottlemyre |first=Steven |date=2021 |title=The United States Intelligence Community, Secrecy and the 'Steele Dossier': Reconceptualizing the Intelligence Process |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357660611 |journal=Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies |volume=4 |issue=2 |pages=11–28}}</ref>

=== United Kingdom ===
The UK intelligence process is similar but often less bureaucratic, with [[MI6]] (SIS) focusing on HUMINT, [[GCHQ]] on SIGINT, and [[MI5]] on domestic security.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16161262.2015.1032496|title=The official history of the Joint Intelligence Committee, volume 1: from the approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis|first=Daniel W. B.|last=Lomas|date=July 3, 2015|journal=Journal of Intelligence History|volume=14|issue=2|pages=148–149|via=Taylor and Francis+NEJM|doi=10.1080/16161262.2015.1032496|url-access=subscription}}</ref> The [[Joint Intelligence Committee (United Kingdom)|Joint Intelligence Committee]] (JIC) plays a key role in assessing intelligence for policymakers, rather than each agency handling it independently.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Aldrich |first=Richard James |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/GCHQ/4I2PmCtrHOgC?hl=en |title=GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency |date=2010 |publisher=HarperPress |isbn=978-0-00-727847-3 |language=en}}</ref>

=== Russia (FSB/GRU/SVR) ===
The Russian approach integrates intelligence directly into active measures (deception, subversion, and disinformation) more than Western counterparts.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Andrew |first=Christopher |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Sword_and_the_Shield/9TWUAQ7Xof8C?hl=en |title=The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB |last2=Mitrokhin |first2=Vasili |date=1999 |publisher=Basic Books |isbn=978-0-465-00312-9 |language=en}}</ref> Analysis and dissemination tend to be more centralized, with intelligence feeding directly into the [[Kremlin|Kremlin’s]] strategic decision-making.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Galeotti |first=Mark |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Russian_Political_War/PPSKDwAAQBAJ?hl=en |title=Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid |date=2019-03-04 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-81209-5 |language=en}}</ref>

=== China (MSS and PLA Intelligence) ===
[[Ministry of State Security (China)|China’s Ministry of State Security]] (MSS) and military intelligence units prioritize long-term strategic intelligence gathering, especially industrial espionage and cyber warfare.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Chinese Communist Espionage |url=https://www.usni.org/press/books/chinese-communist-espionage |access-date=2025-03-05 |website=U.S. Naval Institute |language=en}}</ref> The fusion of intelligence and policy-making is stronger, with the [[Chinese Communist Party]] exerting tight control over the process.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kania |first=Elsa B. |date=2021-06-07 |title=Artificial intelligence in China’s revolution in military affairs |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2021.1894136 |journal=Journal of Strategic Studies |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=515–542 |doi=10.1080/01402390.2021.1894136 |issn=0140-2390|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

=== France (DGSE & DRM) ===
The [[France|French]] intelligence cycle closely resembles the U.S. and UK models, but with a greater focus on economic intelligence to support national industries.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Porch |first=Douglas |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_French_Secret_Services/YOBeKDcb9PcC?hl=en |title=The French Secret Services: A History of French Intelligence from the Drefus Affair to the Gulf War |date=November 2003 |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-374-52945-1 |language=en}}</ref> More autonomy is given to field operatives to gather and assess intelligence in real-time without excessive central oversight.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/auservicedelafra0007unse |title=au service de la france |others=Internet Archive}}</ref>

=== Israel (Mossad, Aman, Shin Bet) ===
Intelligence operations in Israel are highly operationally integrated, meaning the cycle often skips steps (e.g., collection may immediately lead to direct action, such as assassinations or preemptive strikes).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Bar-Zohar |first=Michael |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Mossad/7BIgoMALdwwC?hl=en |title=Mossad: The Greatest Missions of the Israeli Secret Service |last2=Mishal |first2=Nissim |date=2012-11-06 |publisher=Harper Collins |isbn=978-0-06-212344-2 |language=en}}</ref> Intelligence is designed for rapid-action scenarios, given Israel’s security threats.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Bergman |first=Ronen |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Rise_and_Kill_First/YeycDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Bergman,+Rise+and+Kill+First,+2018&printsec=frontcover |title=Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations |date=2019-07-09 |publisher=Random House Publishing Group |isbn=978-0-8129-8211-4 |language=en}}</ref>