Editing Almanzor (section)

== Almanzor, leader of al-Andalus ==
=== Rupture with Subh and concentration of political power ===
[[File:Salon Rico 4.jpg|thumb|right|Interior of [[Madinat al-Zahra|Medina Azahara]], the fortified residence built by Almanzor, where he luxuriously locked Caliph [[Hisham II]] after the failed attempt at rebellion by the Caliph's mother [[Subh of Córdoba|Subh]], after long years of alliance between them.]]
With [[Ghalib ibn Abd al-Rahman|Ghalib]] eliminated and [[Hisham II|Hisham]] unable to perform his duties as Caliph, Almanzor began to weigh preparing for the succession, and even the possibility of officially taking power.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=112}} In 989, he tried unsuccessfully to have the ''faqīhs'' accept his home, Medina Alzahara, as a major mosque.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=159}} From 991 he positioned his son [[Abd al-Malik al-Muzaffar|Abd al-Malik]] in a similar way as [[Al-Hakam II|Al-Hakam]] had done with Hisham, appointing him chamberlain{{Sfn|Martínez Díez|2005|p=524}} and supreme warden of the Caliphate's armies, although Almanzor did not step aside from those roles himself.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=112}} At the same time, he discreetly presented to the ''faqīhs'' who advised the senior Qadi the possibility that he himself might replace the Caliph{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=168}} because Hisham was incapable and no one else in the state could hold the position.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=112}} The regency, formerly founded on Hisham's minority, could no longer be justified by his mere inability to carry out his functions.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=112}} The opinion of the ''faqīhs'', however, was negative:{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=168}} if not Hisham, according to the legal experts, power should devolve to another member of the [[Quraysh|tribe of Muhammad]].{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=13}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=113}} Almanzor reluctantly accepted the decision, and in the following years he gradually assumed even greater powers, corresponding to those of the Caliph: he confirmed the official appointments with his own seal rather than that of the Caliph, in spite of nominally acting on his behalf,{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=166}} he appointed a new mint official, appropriated new titles{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=200}} and moved part of the administration to {{ill|Medina Alzahira|es}}.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=113}} He also had his name mentioned after that of the Caliph in Friday prayers and maintained a court parallel to that of the sovereign at al-Zahira.{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=14}} In 991, under pressure from the chamberlain, the council of ''faqīhs'' changed their unfavorable opinion as to the conversion of Medina Alzahira into a major mosque,{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=160}} although its use continued to be frowned upon by many notable Cordobans.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=162}}

His attempts to seize power ended the long alliance between Almanzor and [[Subh of Córdoba|Subh]] in 996.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=116}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=166}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=114}}{{Sfn|Gálvez Vázquez|1996–1997|p=77}} After twenty years as a representative of Subh, Almanzor confronted the Caliph's mother and her supporters. After the collapse of the alliance, Subh tried with all her might to eliminate Almanzor and united with all his opponents and enemies and divided the court into two factions, a group supporting Almanzor and the survival of his power and another group supporting Subh whose goal was to take over the government by her son.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=114}}{{Sfn|Gálvez Vázquez|1996–1997|p=77}} The clash between the two cliques was triggered by Subh withdrawing eighty thousand dinars from the royal treasury to finance an uprising against the chamberlain.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=165}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=196}} Almanzor discovered this thanks to his agents in the palace,{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=415}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=114}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=175}} and he reacted by successfully petitioning the council of viziers and ''Faqīhs'' to transfer the treasury to his residence, {{ill|Medina Alzahira|es}}, characterizing Subh's theft as a robbery by the harem.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=415}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=114}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=176}} With Almanzor sick, Subh took over the palace and tried in vain to block the transfer.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=176}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=115}} [[Abd al-Malik al-Muzaffar|Abd al-Malik]], Almanzor's son, won the support of the viziers. The Caliph repudiated the rebellion of his mother in late May 996, and Abd al-Malik took custody of both him and the treasure.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=115}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=197}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|pp=176–177}} Though the rebellion she headed on the peninsula lost steam due to loss of funding and the rapid defeat of its few supporters,{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=180}} the money she had previously taken allowed Subh to finance a rebellion in the Maghreb.{{Sfn|Gálvez Vázquez|1996–1997|p=77}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=115}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=178}} Although Almanzor had not yet managed to quell this revolt by fall 997, it failed to gain any support on the peninsula.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=116}}

To reinforce his image and that of his son and successor, Almanzor organized a parade{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=415}} with the Caliph and his mother.{{Sfn|Gálvez Vázquez|1996–1997|p=77}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=116}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=181}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=202}} The gesture served to dispel any doubts about the support of the Caliph for Almanzor, and thus refuted the allegations of [[Ziri ibn Atiyya]], launched from the Maghreb.{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=202}} After the procession, [[Hisham II|Hisham]] was locked up – with all the comforts but without power – in {{ill|Medina Alzahira|es}},{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=116}} where his mother was probably also imprisoned.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=117}} Having lost her confrontation with her former ally, she died shortly thereafter in 999.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=117}} Almanzor, who had renewed his oath of allegiance to the Caliph with the proviso that he delegate{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=415}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=200}} his powers to his family,{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=182}} was strengthened. He sent his son to fight the North African rebellion,{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=202}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=182}} and took charge of all administrative power.{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=13}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=116}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=184}} He counted on the approval of the religious leadership who, fearing possible civil war, supported Almanzor's position as guarantor of stability and of the throne of the impotent Hisham.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=117}} State power was divided in two: with Almanzor blocking exercise of the symbolic and legitimate power of the Caliph, while that of the chamberlain and his successors, devoid of legitimacy for being Yemeni [[Mofarite]] and not of the Prophet's blood, controlled the Caliphate's policy.{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=13}}

=== Reform of army and administration ===
The separation between the temporal power, held by Almanzor, and the spiritual, in the hands of Hisham as Caliph, increased the importance of military force, a symbol – along with the new majesty of the chamberlain's court, rival of that of the caliph himself – of the power of Almanzor, and an instrument to guarantee the payment of taxes.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=119}}

Almanzor successfully continued the military reforms begun by Al-Hakam{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=37}} and his predecessors,{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}} covering many aspects.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=128}} On one hand, he increased the professionalization of the regular army,{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}} necessary both to guarantee his military power in the capital and to ensure the availability of forces for his numerous campaigns, one of the sources of his political legitimacy.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=128}} This policy de-emphasized levies and other non-professional troops, which he replaced with taxes used to support the professional troops—often ''saqalibas'' {{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}} or Maghrebis—which freed the natives of al-Andalus from military service.{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=15}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=128}}{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=46}} Recruitment of ''saqalibas'' and Berbers was not new, but Almanzor expanded it.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=126}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=95}} On the other hand, he created new units, unlike the regular army of the Caliphate, that were faithful primarily to himself{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=126}} and served to control the capital.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=128}}  Emir [[Abd al-Rahman I]] had already used Berbers and ''saqalibas'' for a permanent army of forty thousand to end the conflicts that hitherto had plagued the emirate.{{Sfn|Dozy|2010|p=239}}  At the time of Emir [[Muhammad I of Córdoba|Muhammad I]], the army reached thirty-five to forty thousand combatants, half of them Syrian military contingents.{{Sfn|Cruz Hernández|1992|p=326}} This massive hiring of mercenaries and slaves meant that, according to Christian chroniclers, "ordinarily the Saracen armies amount to 30, 40, 50, or 60,000 men, even when in serious occasions they reach 100, 160, 300 and even 600,000 fighters." {{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=172}} In fact, it has been argued that, in Almanzor's time, the Cordovan armies could muster six hundred thousand laborers and two hundred thousand horses "drawn from all provinces of the empire."{{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=173}}

[[File:Mouwahidoune.jpg|thumb|left|Almanzor's troops, as represented in the ''[[Cantigas de Santa María]]''. The chamberlain carried out wide-ranging military reforms.]]
In order to eliminate a possible threat to his power and to improve military efficiency, Almanzor abolished the system of tribal units{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=14}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=131}}{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=45}} that had been in decline due to lack of Arabs and institution of pseudo-feudalism on the frontiers,{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=130}} in which the different tribes each had their own commander and that had caused continuous clashes, and replaced it with mixed units{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=134}} without clear loyalty under orders from Administration officials.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=129}} The nucleus of the new army, however, was formed increasingly by Maghrebi Berber forces.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=46}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=95}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=130}} The ethnic rivalries among Arabs, Berbers and Slavs within the Andalusi army were skillfully used by Almanzor to maintain his own power{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=95}}--for example, by ordering that every unit of the army consist of diverse ethnic groups so that they would not unite against him;{{sfn|Vara|2012}} and thus preventing the emergence of possible rivals.{{Sfn|Russell|Carr|1982|p=70}} However, once their centralizing figure disappeared, these units were one of the main causes of the 11th-century civil war called the ''[[Fitna of al-Andalus]]''.{{Sfn|Russell|Carr|1982|p=70}} Berber forces were also joined by contingents of well-paid Christian mercenaries,{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=140}} who formed the bulk of Almanzor's personal guard and participated in his campaigns in Christian territories.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=133}} Almanzor's completion of this reform, begun by his predecessors, fundamentally divided the population into two unequal groups: a large mass of civilian taxpayers and a small professional military caste, generally from outside the peninsula.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=119}}

The increase in military forces and their partial professionalization led to an increase in financial expenses to sustain them.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}} This represented an additional incentive to carry out campaigns, which produced loot and land with which to pay the troops.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=133}} These lands, when handed over to the soldiers as payment, were thereafter subject to tribute and ceased to operate under a system of border colonization.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=134}}{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=118}} The Caliphal army was funded by the taxpaying farmers in exchange for military exemptions, and consisted of local recruits as well as foreign mercenaries – Berber militias, Slav and Black slaves, mercenary Christian companies and [[jihad]]i volunteers.{{Sfn|Ríu Ríu|1988|p=72}} At that time al-Andalus was known as ''Dar Jihad'', or "country of jihad", and attracted many volunteers, and though these were relatively few compared to the total army, their zeal in combat more than compensated for this.{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}}

According to modern studies, these mercenary contingents made it possible to increase the total size of the Caliphal army from thirty or fifty thousand troops in the time of Abd al-Rahman III to fifty or ninety thousand.{{Sfn|Cruz Hernández|1992|p=326}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|1991|p=23}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=39}} Others, like [[Évariste Lévi-Provençal]], argue that the Cordoban armies in the field with the Almanzor were between thirty-five thousand and seventy or seventy-five thousand soldiers.{{Sfn|Ríu Ríu|1988|p=72}}{{Sfn|Weiner|2001|p=15}} Contemporary figures are contradictory: some accounts claim that their armies numbered two hundred thousand horsemen and six hundred thousand foot soldiers, while others talk about twelve thousand horsemen, three thousand mounted Berbers and two thousand ''sūdān'', African light infantry.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=138}} According to the chronicles, in the campaign that swept [[Astorga, Spain|Astorga]] and [[León, Spain|León]], Almanzor led twelve thousand African and five thousand Al Andalus horsemen, and forty thousand infantry.{{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=173}} It is also said that, in his last campaigns, he mobilized forty-six thousand horsemen, while another six hundred guarded the train, twenty-six thousand infantry, two hundred scouts or 'police' and one hundred and thirty [[drummer]]s.{{Sfn|Vallvé Bermejo|1992|p=125|ps=: "Normalmente participaban en sus aceifas doce mil hombres de a caballo, inscritos en la escalilla militar y a los que, además de la acostumbrada soldada, se les proporcionaban una caballería con sus arreos, armas, alojamiento, pagas y gratificaciones para diversos gastos, y forraje para las caballerías, según su categoría."}} or that the garrison of Cordoba consisted of 10,500 horsemen and many others kept the northern border in dispersed detachments.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=140}} However, it is much more likely that the leader's armies, even in their most ambitious campaigns, may not have exceeded twenty thousand men.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=140}} It can be argued that until the eleventh century no Muslim army on campaign exceeded thirty thousand troops, while during the eighth century the trans-Pyrenean expeditions totaled ten thousand men and those carried out against Christians in the north of the peninsula were even smaller.{{Sfn|Cruz Hernández|1992|p=326}}

In the time of Emir Al-Hakam I, a palatine guard of 3000 riders and 2000 infantry was created, all Slavic slaves.{{Sfn|Arié|1984|p=124}} This proportion between the two types of troops was maintained until Almanzor's reforms.  The massive incorporation of North African horsemen relegated the infantry to sieges and fortress garrisons.{{Sfn|Arié|1984|p=137}} This reform led to entire tribes, particularly Berber riders, being moved to the peninsula.{{Sfn|González Batista|2007|p=116}}

The main weapon of the peninsular campaigns, which required speed and surprise, was the light cavalry.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=45}} To try to counteract them, the Castilians created the role of "villain knights" – ennobling those free men who were willing to keep a horse to increase the mounted units – through the ''Fuero de Castrojeriz'' of 974.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=45}} For similar reasons, the Barcelonan count [[Borrell II, Count of Barcelona|Borrell II]] created the figure of the ''homes of paratge''- who obtained privileged military status by fighting against the Cordobans armed on horseback – after losing their capital in the fall of 985.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=93}} In contrast to the prominent role the navy had played in previous decades under Abd al-Rahman III,{{Sfn|De Bordejé Morencos|1992|p=111}} under Almanzor it served only as a means of transporting ground troops,{{Sfn|De Bordejé Morencos|1992|p=113}} such as between the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula, or [[Alcácer do Sal]]'s ships in the campaign against [[Santiago de Compostela]] in 997.{{Sfn|De Bordejé Morencos|1992|p=113}}

During this time, military industry flourished in factories around Córdoba.{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}} It was said to be able to produce a thousand bows and twenty thousand arrows monthly,{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=39}} and 1300 shields{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}} and three thousand campaign stores annually.{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=39}}

As for the fleet, its network of ports was reinforced with a new base in the Atlantic, in Alcácer do Sal, which protected the area of [[Coimbra]], recovered in the 980s, and served as the origin of the units that participated in the campaign against Santiago.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=134}} On the Mediterranean shore, the naval defense was centered at the base of al-Mariya, now [[Almería]].{{Sfn|Martínez Enamorado|Torremocha Silva|2001|p=146}}  The [[Shipyard|dockyards]] of the fleet had been built in [[Tortosa]] in 944.{{Sfn|Vernet Ginés|1979|p=403}}

Initially the maritime defense of the Caliphate was led by Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Rumahis, a veteran admiral who had served Al-Hakam II and was Qadi of [[Province of Granada|Elvira]]{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=153}} and [[Pechina]].{{Sfn|Martínez Enamorado|Torremocha Silva|2001|p=146}} He repulsed raids by ''al-Magus'' (idolaters) or ''al-Urdumaniyun'' ('men of the north', [[vikings]]),<ref>Crespi, Gabriele (1982). "L'Europe Musulmane". ''Les Formes de la nuit''. No. 2. Saint Léger-Vauban: Zodiaque, pp. 55. En francés. {{ISSN|0763-7608}}.</ref> in the west of al-Andalus in mid-971;{{Sfn|Morales Romero|2004|p=195}} at the end of that year, when they tried to invade Al Andalus,{{Sfn|Allen|ʻAbd_al-Raḥmān|2002|p=130}} the admiral left Almería and defeated them off the coast of [[Algarve]].{{Sfn|Tapia Garrido|1976|p=166}} In April 973, he transported the army of Ghalib from Algeciras{{Sfn|Martínez Enamorado|Torremocha Silva|2001|p=93}} to subdue the rebellious tribes of the Maghreb and end Fatimid ambitions in that area.{{Sfn|Jiménez Losantos|1999|p=78}} As in 997, when the Al Andalus fleet hit the [[Galicia (Spain)|Galician]] coast, in 985 it had ravaged the [[Catalans]].{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=62}} During the Catalan campaign, [[Gausfred I]], Count of [[County of Empúries|Empurias]] and [[Counts of Roussillon|Roussillon]], tried to gather an army to help the locals but then several flotillas of Berber pirates threatened their coasts, forcing them to stay to defend their lands.{{Sfn|Frers|2008|p=66}}

To ensure control of the military, Almanzor eliminated the main figures who could have opposed his reforms:{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=134}} in addition to the death of Ghalib, the participation of the governor of Zaragoza in the plot of his eldest son served as a justification to replace him{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=152}} with another, more amenable, member of the same clan, the Banu Tujib.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=100}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=135}} The admiral of the fleet,{{Sfn|Suárez Fernández|1976|p=354}} who maintained a significant budget, was poisoned{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=431}} in January 980{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=154}} and replaced by a man faithful to Almanzor.{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=153}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=135}}

As in the Army he encouraged the recruitment of Berbers faithful to him, so in the Administration he favored the ''saqalibas'' to the detriment of native officials, again with the aim of surrounding himself with personnel loyal only to him.{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=15}}

Land transport routes were dotted with strongholds,{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}} since ancient Al Andalus dignitaries sought to control communications.{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=40}} Messengers were bought in [[Sudan]] and specially trained to handle Almanzor's messages and to transmit the official reports that his foreign ministries wrote about the annual campaigns.{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=40}}

The Caliphate ruled by Almanzor was a rich and powerful state. According to Colmeiro, it is estimated that in a pre-industrial society, for every million inhabitants, ten thousand soldiers could be mustered. Even assuming the chronicles exaggerated tenfold the real numbers – these speak of eight hundred thousand soldiers – the caliphate could have had eight million inhabitants.{{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=173}} Those who use more bullish criteria estimate between seven{{Sfn|Matés Baco|Agustín González|2006|p=48}} and ten{{Sfn|Ríu Ríu|1988|p=66}} million, but the population was probably much fewer.{{Sfn|Matés Baco|Agustín González|2006|p=48}}{{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=173}} Traditionally speaking, around the year 1000, the caliphate occupied four hundred thousand square kilometers and was populated by three million souls.{{Sfn|Fusi Azpurúa|2012|p=50}} By comparison, the Iberian Christian states comprised one hundred and sixty thousand square kilometers and half a million people.{{Sfn|Fusi Azpurúa|2012|p=49}} By the 10th century, 75% of the population under the Umayyads had converted to Islam, a number reaching 80% two centuries later.{{Sfn|Marín Guzmán|2006|p=109}} By comparison, at the time of the Muslim invasion, Spain had about four million inhabitants, although there is no shortage of historians who would raise that estimate to seven or eight million.{{Sfn|Marín Guzmán|2006|p=109}}

His realm also had large cities like Córdoba, which surpassed one hundred thousand inhabitants; [[Toledo, Spain|Toledo]], Almería and [[Granada]], which were around thirty thousand; and Zaragoza, [[Valencia]] and [[Málaga]], all above fifteen thousand.{{Sfn|Matés Baco|Agustín González|2006|p=48}} This contrasted sharply with the Christian north of the peninsula, which lacked large urban centers.{{Sfn|Mitre Fernández|1979|p=134}}

=== Defense of religious orthodoxy and legitimation of power ===
One of the instruments Almazor used to strengthen his power was his court,{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=14}} at which writers and poets celebrated his virtues—praise that was used as propaganda among the people.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=208}}

[[File:Prayer in the Mosque.jpg|thumb|right|Praying in the mosque. Among the gestures that Almanzor made in service of his image as Defender of the Faith was the expansion of [[Mosque–Cathedral of Córdoba|Córdoba's mosque]].]]
The stability and prosperity of the regime and its rigorous defense of Islam, which Almanzor showed through various pious gestures, gave him popular support.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=119}} Also numbered among these gestures were copying a Koran that he took with him during his campaigns,{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=407}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=216}} and the expansion of the [[Mosque–Cathedral of Córdoba|mosque of Cordoba]] (987–990).{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=119}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=54}} The political ambitions of the chamberlain had important repercussions on culture and religion, which he was forced to support.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=208}} His image as Islam's leader led to the censorship of some sciences considered non-Islamic, and to the purging from Al-Hakam's important library of works considered heretical.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=407}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=104}}{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=119}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=209}}{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=36}} His political interests required him to ingratiate himself with the lawyers when his power was still unsteady, and led him to censure logic, philosophy and astrology, despite his appreciation for culture.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=105}} His meddling in religious matters led to the appointment of his own uncle, himself a veteran qadi, as the principal qadi after the death of the hostile Ibn Zarb, who had opposed some of his proposals.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=219}} The main expression of his defense of religion, however, was his military campaigns against the Christian states, a method of legitimization that the caliphs had used before but which Almanzor took to extremes.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=119}} Successive victories, despite their transient benefits to the realm, had a great propaganda effect,{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=226}} both in the Caliphate and in the enemy states of the north.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=120}} To each crisis of his political career, he responded with large and/or multiple military campaigns.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=226}}

The campaigns also had a beneficial economic effect because of the loot – especially abundant slaves – obtained by them and because of the security they granted to the borders.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=225}}

=== The Maghreb campaigns ===
The meager Cordoban cereal production forced the Umayyads to obtain stocks from the Maghreb, and, thus, to oppose Fatimid expansion in the region, which jeopardized their supply.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=162}} At stake was commercial control of the western Mediterranean.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=30}} Unlike his campaigns on the Iberian Peninsula and with the exception of the one carried out jointly with Ghalib at the beginning of his career, Almanzor did not take a personal role in the fighting in the Maghreb, but simply a supervisory one.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=216}} The effective direction of the fight was in the hands of subordinates, whom he would ceremonially accompany to Algeciras to see off the troops as they crossed the strait.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=216}}

Abd al-Rahman III had conquered Ceuta and [[Tangier]] and fortified them in 951, but he had not been able to prevent the Fatimids from taking control of the Maghreb in 958–959, after burning the Umayyad fleet in Almería in 955.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=30}} In 971, Umayyad clients suffered another heavy defeat.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=387}} The Fatimid march to Egypt around 972 benefitted the Umayyads, who were left facing a Fatimid client, the [[Sanhaja]] Berber [[Buluggin ibn Ziri]].{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=30}}{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=387}}

[[File:ZiríesComoClientesFatimíes.svg|thumb|right|upright=1.6|The situation in the Maghreb at the end of the 970s.]]
The Caliphate's strategy began by the fortification of Ceuta, manned by a large garrison.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=430}} In May of 978,{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=141}} the [[Zenata]] tribes seized the city of [[Sijilmasa]], at the northern end of the trans-[[Sahara]]n gold, salt and textile trading routes, and where they founded a pro-Córdoba principality ruled by Jazrun ibn Fulful,{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=430}} the city's conqueror.{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=139}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=137}} The success of the Umayyad political machine, continued by Almanzor,{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=430}} allowed him to concentrate the offensive power of the Berber tribes on the expansion of the regions that recognized his legitimacy and limited clashes among those accepting Córdoba's protection.{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=139}} This conquest, which gave great prestige to Hisham and Almanzor—and affronted the Fatimids because it was the city where its founder had appeared before the Berber [[Kutama]] tribe{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=141}}--allowed them to counteract the influence of the Fatimids who, after moving to Egypt, had left these regions under the control of the [[Zirid dynasty]].{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=121}} Ibn Ziri launched a victorious campaign that temporarily disrupted the Zenata and allowed him to recover much of the Western Maghreb before besieging Ceuta.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=431}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=148}} The refugees there asked for help from Almanzor, who sent a large army that he accompanied as far as Algeciras, to repulse Ibn Ziri, who decided to retire{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=431}} although he continued harassing Umayyad supporters until his death in 984.{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=148}} The effects of Ibn Ziri's inroads, however, were transient: at his death most of the tribes of the region once again accepted Cordoban religious authority.{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=154}}

In 985, before the Idrisid [[Al-Hasan ibn Kannun]], who had proclaimed himself Caliph, returned from his refuge in the Fatimid court in Egypt, Almanzor saw off a new army that crossed the Maghreb to confront him under command of his cousin.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=431}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=144}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=156}}{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=94}} Reinforcements were later dispatched, commanded by the eldest son of Almanzor, and his father-in-law, the governor of Zaragoza.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=431}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=144}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=156}} Overwhelmed, the Idrisid negotiated his surrender and proceeded to the Cordoban court,{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=144}} but Almanzor had him assassinated on his way to the city, and later executed{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=432}} his cousin who had granted safe conduct to the rebel.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=431}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=156}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=146}}

The disagreements among the various tribal leaders loyal to the Umayyads did produce one crisis: the favor shown by Almanzor to [[Ziri ibn Atiyya]] of the [[Maghrawa]] Berbers upset other chiefs, who ended up rising in arms. They defeated the Cordoban governor of [[Fez, Morocco|Fez]], who died in combat, and Ibn Atiyya in April 991.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=432}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=143}} After this defeat, Almanzor understood the need to grant control of the region to local Berber leaders instead of trying to govern through Iberian delegates.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=144}} This strategy aimed to attract the support of local tribes to the Umayyads.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=144}} Fundamentally, the fate of the campaigns depended on the changing loyalties of the various tribal leaders, although, in general, the Zenata supported the Umayyads while the Sanhaja supported the Fatimids.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=121}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=144}} Almanzor unsuccessfully attempted to divide the territory between Ibn Attiya and another tribal chief who had abandoned the Fatimids—the uncle of al-Mansur ibn Buluggin, son and successor of Buluggin ibn Ziri.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=432}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=144}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=178}}  So, Almanzor gave all lands controlled by the Caliphate to Ibn Atiyya,{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=433}}{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=120}} who managed to defeat the rebels and supporters of the Fatimids in 994,{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=433}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=146}} and founded a small principality centered on [[Oujda]].{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=120}}{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=433}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=146}}

The crisis between Almanzor and the royal family in 996–998 caused a confrontation between him and Ibn Atiyya,{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=180}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=192}} who considered Almanzor's attitude towards the Caliph to be disrespectful.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=146}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=191}} Seeing in Ibn Atiyya a threat to his power, Almanzor dismissed him{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=121}}{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=110}} and sent forces to combat him.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=180}}{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=433}}{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=192}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=147}} The [[Maghrawa|Banu Maghrawa]], the [[Banu Ifran]] and [[Miknasa|Banu Miknasa]] joined the Al Andalus forces landing at Tangier,{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=433}} soon receiving reinforcements commanded by the Almanzor's son,{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=110}}{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=434}} already chamberlain.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=147}} At the beginning of August 998, Almanzor himself went to Algeciras with the numerous reinforcements destined to participate in the campaign.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=182}}{{Sfn|Martínez Díez|2005|p=562}} In October 998, Abd al-Malik managed to defeat Ibn Atiyya and put him to flight,{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=147}}{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=435}} although Almanzor still sought local support for the Umayyad administration.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=148}} Until his death, however, the territorial government remained in the hands of successive Iberian officials.{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=435}}

The campaigns in the Maghreb also had an important consequence for Iberian politics: Almanzor brought Berber troops and warlords to the peninsula,{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=121}} both to form his personal troops and as contingents in the campaigns against Christian territories.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=148}} Some of these leaders were even named viziers, which did not prevent their occasional fall from grace.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=148}}