Swissair Flight 111
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Swissair Flight 111 (SR111/SWR111) was a scheduled international passenger flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, United States, to Cointrin Airport in Geneva, Switzerland. The flight was also a codeshare flight with Delta Air Lines.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On 2 September 1998, the McDonnell Douglas MD-11 performing this flight, registration HB-IWF, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean southwest of Halifax Stanfield International Airport at the entrance to St. Margarets Bay, Nova Scotia, Canada. The crash site was Template:Convert from shore, roughly equidistant from the small fishing and tourist communities of Peggy's Cove and Bayswater. All 215 passengers and 14 crew members on board the plane were killed, making the crash the deadliest accident in the history of Swissair and the deadliest accident involving the McDonnell Douglas MD-11. It is also the second-deadliest aviation accident to occur in Canada, behind Arrow Air Flight 1285R.
The search and rescue response, crash recovery operation and investigation by the government of Canada took more than four years and cost CA$57 million.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The investigation carried out by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) concluded that flammable material used in the aircraft's structure allowed a fire to spread beyond the control of the flight crew, resulting in the crash of the aircraft. Several wide-ranging recommendations were made which were incorporated into newer US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standards.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Rp
BackgroundEdit
AircraftEdit
The aircraft involved, manufactured in 1991, was a seven-year-old McDonnell Douglas MD-11 and registered as HB-IWF.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp The aircraft was powered by three Pratt & Whitney PW4462 turbofan engines and the aircraft had logged 36,041 airframe hours before the accident.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp It bore the title of Vaud.<ref name="cockpit2013">Template:Cite journal</ref> The cabin was configured with 241 passenger seats. First and business class seats were equipped with in-seat in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems from Interactive Flight Technologies.<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref><ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
The in-flight entertainment system was the first of its kind equipped on the aircraft.<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref> It allowed the first and business class passengers to select their own movies and games, and to gamble. The system was installed in business class one year before the incident, between 21 August and 9 September 1997. It was installed in first class five months later, in February 1998, due to delivery delays.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
CrewEdit
In command was 49-year-old Captain Urs Zimmermann.<ref name="pilotswife"/> At the time of the accident, he had logged approximately 10,800 hours of total flying time, of which 900 hours were logged in the MD-11. He was also an instructor pilot for the MD-11. Before his career with Swissair, he was a fighter pilot in the Swiss Air Force from 1966 to 1970. Zimmermann was described as a friendly person with professional skills, who always worked with exactness and precision.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp Zimmermann was due to turn 50 the day after the accident.<ref name="pilotswife">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
The first officer, 36-year-old Stefan Löw, had logged approximately 4,800 hours of total flying time, including 230 hours on the MD-11.<ref name="cockpit2013"/><ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp He was an instructor on the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 and the Airbus A320. From 1982 to 1990, Löw had been a pilot in the Swiss Air Force.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp The cabin crew comprised a maître de cabine (purser) and eleven flight attendants. All crew members on board Flight 111 were qualified, certified, and trained in accordance with Swiss regulations under the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA).<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
Flight timelineEdit
Flight 111 took off from New York City's John F. Kennedy International Airport at 20:18 EDT (00:18 UTC) on 2 September 1998.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp From 20:33 – 20:47 EDT (00:33 to 00:47 UTC), the aircraft experienced a radio blackout for approximately thirteen minutes, which was later found to be caused by communication radio tuning errors.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
At 22:10 ADT (01:10 UTC, 52 minutes after takeoff), while flying over Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, the flight crew detected an odour in the cockpit and determined it to be smoke from the air conditioning system.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Four minutes later, the odour returned and smoke became visible, prompting the pilots to make a "pan-pan" radio call to Moncton air traffic control (ATC), the area control center (ACC) station in charge of air traffic over Nova Scotia. The pan-pan call indicated that there was an urgency due to smoke in the cockpit but did not declare an emergency as denoted by a "mayday" call. The crew requested a diversion to Boston (Template:Convert away) before accepting Moncton ATC's offer of radar vectors to the closer Halifax International Airport in Enfield, Nova Scotia, Template:Convert away.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
At 22:18 ADT (01:18 UTC), Moncton ATC handed over traffic control of the plane to Halifax ATC, which was in charge of controlling traffic in and out of Halifax International Airport. Upon being advised by Halifax ATC that they were Template:Convert from Halifax airport, the crew requested more flight distance to allow the aircraft to descend safely from its altitude of Template:Convert at the time. The crew then requested to dump fuel to reduce their weight for landing. Halifax thus vectored the plane south toward St. Margaret's Bay,<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp where it was safe for the aircraft to dump fuel while remaining within Template:Convert of the airport.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
In accordance with the Swissair checklist "Smoke/fumes of unknown origin", the flight crew shut off power to the cabin using the "CABIN BUS" switch, which also turned off the recirculating fans in the cabin's ceiling. This allowed the fire to spread to the cockpit, eventually shutting off power to the aircraft's autopilot.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp At 22:24:28 ADT (01:24:28 UTC), the crew informed Halifax that "we now must fly manually", followed by an emergency declaration. Ten seconds later, the crew declared an emergency again, saying "...and we are declaring emergency now, Swissair one eleven"; this was the last transmission received from Flight 111.<ref name="cvr980902">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
The aircraft flight data recorder stopped operating at 22:25:40 ADT (01:25:40 UTC), followed one second later by the cockpit voice recorder. The aircraft's transponder briefly resumed transmission of secondary radar returns from 22:25:50 to 22:26:04 ADT (01:25:50 to 01:26:04 UTC), at which time the aircraft's altitude was Template:Convert. After this, the aircraft could be tracked only through primary radar, which does not provide altitude information.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
The fire soon spread further and disabled multiple critical flight instruments. It is believed by many that Captain Zimmerman got up out of his seat and tried to fight the now visible fire.
Engine 2 was shut down by First Officer Löw approximately one minute prior to the time of impact. The shutdown of Engine 2 would have had little or no adverse effect on aircraft controllability. With Captain Zimmermann likely dead or incapacitated by fire and smoke, in a smoke-filled cockpit, and with almost no flight instruments and little to no view outside, it is possible that Löw became spatially disoriented and as a result, flew into the sea. Another possibility is that while attempting to see outside the cockpit windows, Löw inadvertently pushed the control column forward, thus resulting in a descent and eventual impact with the water. <ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
At 22:31:18 ADT (01:31:18 UTC), Flight 111 struck the ocean at an estimated speed of Template:Convert. The impact time also coincides with seismographic recorders at Halifax and Moncton which detected a seismic event at the time. The collision with the water decelerated the aircraft with approximately 350 g, causing it to disintegrate instantly.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp The location of the crash was identified as approximately 44°24′33″N 63°58′25″W.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
VictimsEdit
| Final tally of passenger nationalitiesTemplate:Efn | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Nationality | Passengers | Crew | Total |
| Afghanistan | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Canada | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Canada and Morocco | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| China | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Egypt | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| France | 41 | 0 | 41 |
| France and United Kingdom | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| France and United States | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Germany | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Greece and United States | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Greece | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| India | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Iran | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Iran and United States | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Israel and Switzerland | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Italy | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Mexico | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Russia | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Saudi Arabia | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Switzerland | 31 | 13 | 44 |
| Switzerland and Netherlands | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Switzerland and United Kingdom | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Switzerland and United States | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Spain | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| United Kingdom | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| United Kingdom and United States | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| United States | 110 | 1 | 111 |
| Yugoslavia | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 215 | 14 | 229 |
There were 132 Americans (including one employee each from Delta Air Lines and United Airlines), 41 Swiss (including the 13 crew members), 30 French, 3 British, 4 Canadian, 3 Italian, 2 Greek, 2 Lebanese, 1 each from Afghanistan, China, Germany, India, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis,<ref>St. Kitts and Nevis nationality was estimated by Swiss Air on 4 September 1998 based on passports of ticketholders, but was not listed as a nationality of any of the passengers in the list of names published 7 September 1998. See CNN citations at end of this section.</ref> Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia, and 4 other passengers on board.<ref name="FromEuropeAndNewYork2">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="CNN12">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Epidemiologists Jonathan Mann and Mary Lou Clements-Mann, both prominent researchers of HIV/AIDS and a married couple, died in the crash.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Joseph LaMotta, son of boxing legend Jake LaMotta, also died. The LaMotta family later sued Swissair for his death.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Post-crash responseEdit
Search and rescue operationEdit
The search and rescue (SAR) operation was code-named Operation Persistence and was launched immediately by Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Halifax (JRCC Halifax).<ref name="Veterans Affairs Canada">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The search and rescue operation consisted of 400 Royal Canadian Air Force personnel,<ref name="Veterans Affairs Canada" /> the Royal Canadian Navy,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> 700 Canadian Army personnel, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary (CCGA) resources, and 450 Royal Canadian Mounted Police and more than 2400 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel who were participating as part of Operation Homage.<ref name="Veterans Affairs Canada" /><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp The United States Navy and the Red Cross were also involved in the operation.<ref name="Veterans Affairs Canada" />
Local fishermen and boaters, many of whom were CCGA volunteers, were the first rescue resources to approach the crash site,<ref name="Veterans Affairs Canada" /> which were mostly privately owned fishing boats operating from Peggy's Cove and Bayswater, as well as other harbours on St. Margaret's Bay and the Aspotogan Peninsula. They were soon joined by the CCGS Sambro.<ref name="Sarscene">Template:Cite journal</ref>
The crash site's proximity to Halifax placed it within one hour's sailing time of ships docked at Canada's largest naval base, CFB Halifax, and one of the largest CCG bases in Canada, the CCG Regional Headquarters in Dartmouth. Calls went out immediately and ships sailed directly to St. Margaret's Bay.<ref name="tridentnews.ca">Template:Cite news</ref>
The provincial ambulance service, Emergency Health Services (EHS), received word of the crash at 22:39 AT, and ordered 21 emergency units from Halifax, the South Shore, and the Annapolis Valley to respond. An EHS helicopter was also sent to the crash site, and the Queen Elizabeth II Health Sciences Centre in Halifax was put on emergency alert. The emergency health services were stood down around 3:30 AT the next morning, as expectations of finding survivors diminished.<ref name="nsefforts">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
The land search, including shoreline searching, was the responsibility of Halifax Regional Search and Rescue. The organization was responsible for all ground operations including military operations and other ground search and rescue teams.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
| List of vessels involved in the search and rescue actions | |
|---|---|
The following are ships that took part in the search and rescue operation after the accident.
| |
Search and recovery operationEdit
By the afternoon of 3 September, it was apparent that there were no survivors from the crash.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> On the morning of 4 September, JRCC Halifax de-tasked dedicated SAR assets and the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) were given control of the scene.<ref>Template:Cite magazine</ref>
The aircraft broke up on impact with the water and most of the debris sank to the ocean floor (a depth of Template:Convert). Some debris was found floating in the crash area and over the following weeks debris washed up on the nearby shorelines.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
The initial focus of the recovery was on finding and identifying human remains and on recovering the flight recorders. As the force of impact was "in the order of at least 350 g",<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp the aircraft was fragmented and the environmental conditions only allowed the recovery of human remains along with the aircraft wreckage.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp Only one of the victims was visually identifiable. Eventually, 147 were identified by fingerprint, dental records, and X-ray comparisons. The remaining 81 were identified through DNA tests.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>Template:Rp
With CAF divers (navy clearance divers, port inspection divers, ship's team divers, and Army combat divers) working on the recovery, a request was made by the Government of Canada to the Government of the United States for a larger dedicated salvage recovery vessel. Template:USS was tasked to the recovery effort, arriving from Philadelphia on 9 September. Among GrappleTemplate:'s crew were 32 salvage divers. Additionally, the USS Grapple welcomed two teams of Canadian Navy Clearance Divers that flew across Canada from Fleet Diving Unit (FDU) Pacific.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>"U.S. Navy assists with recovery of Swissair Flight 111." (Archive) United States Navy. Retrieved on 6 September 2012.</ref>
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) were found by the submarine HMCS Okanagan using sonar to detect the underwater locator beacon signals and were quickly retrieved by Canadian Navy divers (the FDR on 6 September and the CVR on 11 September 1998). Both had stopped recording when the aircraft lost electrical power at approximately Template:Convert, 5 minutes and 37 seconds before impact.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
The recovery operation was guided by the TSB with resources from the Canadian Forces, Canadian Coast Guard, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and other agencies. The area was surveyed using route survey sonar, laser line scanners, and remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) to locate items. After being located, the debris was then recovered (initially by divers and ROVs, later by dredging and trawling).<ref>Wiggins, T.W. Minor War Vessel Involvement Template:Webarchive</ref>
On 2 October 1998, the TSB initiated a heavy lift operation to retrieve the major portion of the wreckage from the deep water before the expected winter storms began. By 21 October, an estimated 27% of the wreckage was recovered.<ref>Transportation Safety Board Template:Webarchive</ref> At that point in the investigation, the crash was generally believed to have been caused by faulty wiring in the cockpit after the IFE system started to overheat. The TSB released its preliminary report on 30 August 2000 and the final report in 2003.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
The final phase of wreckage recovery employed the ship Template:Ship to dredge the remaining aircraft debris. It concluded in December 1999 with 98% of the aircraft retrieved: approximately Template:Convert of aircraft debris and Template:Convert of cargo.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
Response to victims' families and friendsEdit
JFK Airport used the JFK Ramada Plaza Hotel to house relatives and friends of the victims of the crash, due to the hotel's central location relative to the airport.<ref name="AdamsonPhilly">Adamson, April. "229 Victims Knew Jet Was In Trouble Airport Inn Becomes Heartbreak Hotel Again Template:Webarchive." Philadelphia Inquirer. 4 September 1998. Retrieved on 9 March 2014.</ref> Jerome Hauer, the head of the emergency management task force of New York City, praised the swift actions of Swissair and codeshare partner Delta Air Lines in responding to the accident; he had criticized Trans World Airlines in its response to the TWA Flight 800 crash in 1996.<ref>"Airlines act swiftly to help relatives New U.S. law required detailed emergency plan ." Boston Globe at The Baltimore Sun. 4 September 1998. Retrieved on 9 March 2014.</ref>
InvestigationEdit
Identification of victimsEdit
The RCMP medical examiners positively identified most of the bodies within ten weeks of the accident. Due to extreme impact forces, only one body was identifiable by sight. DNA profiling was used to identify approximately one hundred bodies. At the time, it was "the largest DNA identification project ever undertaken in Canada".<ref name="cmaj2">Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The RCMP contacted relatives of victims to request medical histories and dental records. They were also asked to provide blood samples for genetic matching in the DNA identification of the victims. About 90 bodies were identified by the medical examiners using dental records; owing to the large number of ante-mortem (before death) dental X-rays available to the examiners, these bodies were identified by late October 1998. Fingerprints and ante-mortem X-rays were used to identify around 30 bodies.<ref name="cmaj2" />
Examination of wreckageEdit
An estimated 2 million pieces of debris were recovered and brought ashore for inspection at a secure handling facility in a marine industrial park at Sheet Harbour, where small material was hand inspected by teams of RCMP officers looking for human remains, personal effects, and valuables from the aircraft's cargo hold. The material was then transported to CFB Shearwater, where it was sorted and inspected by over 350 investigators from multiple organizations and companies, including the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB), the US National Transportation Safety Board, the US Federal Aviation Administration, the Swiss Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, Air Line Pilots Association, and Swissair.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp<ref>TSB STI-098 Template:Webarchive Supporting Technical Information</ref>
As each piece of wreckage was brought in, it was carefully cleaned with fresh water, sorted, and weighed. The item was then placed in a specific area of a hangar at CFB Shearwater, based on a grid system representing the various sections of the plane. All items not considered significant to the crash were stored with similar items in large boxes. When a box was full, it was weighed and moved to a custom-built temporary structure (J-Hangar) on a discontinued runway for long-term storage. If deemed significant to the investigation, the item was documented, photographed, and kept in the active examination hangar.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp Particular attention was paid to any item showing heat damage, burns, or other unusual marks. The front Template:Convert of the aircraft, from the front of the cockpit to near the front of the first-class passenger cabin, was reconstructed. Information gained by this allowed investigators to determine the severity and limits of the fire damage, its possible origins, and progression.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
The lack of flight recorder data for the last six minutes of the flight added significant complexity to the investigation and was a major factor in its lengthy duration. The TSB team had to reconstruct the final six minutes entirely from the physical evidence. The investigation became the largest and most expensive transport accident investigation in Canadian history, costing CA$57 million (US$48.5 million) over five years.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Cockpit recordingsEdit
The cockpit voice recorder used a Template:Convert recording tape that operated on a 30-minute loop. It therefore retained only that half-hour of the flight before the recorders failed, six minutes before the crash.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp The CVR recording and transcript were covered by a strict privilege under section 28 of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> and thus were not publicly disclosed, although the air traffic control recordings are less strictly privileged: section 29 of the same act provides only that they may not be used in certain legal proceedings.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The air traffic control transcripts were released within days of the crash in 1998<ref name="CVR Transcript">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> and the air traffic control audio was released in May 2007,<ref>the Toronto Star Template:Webarchive (accessed 25 May 2007).</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> following a ruling by the Federal Court of Appeal.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Several key minutes of the air traffic control audio can be found on the Toronto Star web site.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
In 1999, an article<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> in The Wall Street Journal alleged that the pilots disagreed about whether to dump fuel or descend straight to Halifax. Based on internal TSB summaries of the CVR recording, the Journal claimed that co-pilot Löw suggested steps aimed at a quick landing, which were ignored or rejected by Captain Zimmermann. Swissair and Canadian investigators would not comment on the accuracy of the reporting, with a TSB spokesman deeming it "a reporter's interpretation of a summary document of what might have been" on the CVR.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Probable causeEdit
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigation identified eleven causes and contributing factors of the crash in its final report. The first and most prominent was:
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Investigators identified evidence of arcing in wiring of the in-flight entertainment network (IFEN), but this did not trip the circuit breakers, which were not designed to trip on arcing. The investigation was unable to determine whether this arc was the "lead event" that was assumed to have ignited the flammable covering on MPET insulation blankets that quickly spread across other flammable materials.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp After the crew cut power to "non-essential" cabin systems, a reverse flow in the cockpit ventilation ducts increased the amount of smoke reaching the flight deck.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp By the time the crew became aware of the severity of the fire, it had become so extensive that it was impossible to address as it happened.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
The rapid spread of electrical power failures led to the breakdown of key avionics systems, and the crew was soon rendered unable to control the aircraft. The pilot-in-command was forced to fly manually because he had no light by which to see his controls after the instrument lighting failed. The fuel-laden plane was above maximum landing weight so the flight crew activated dumping of fuel. The pilots lost all control and the doomed plane flew into the ocean uncommanded. Recovered fragments of the plane show that the temperature inside the cockpit became so great that aluminium parts in the flight deck ceiling had melted. The recovered standby attitude indicator and airspeed indicators showed that the aircraft struck the water at Template:Convert in a 20 degrees nose down and 110-degree bank attitude; the impact force of the aircraft crashing into the Atlantic Ocean was calculated to be 350 times the force of gravity (G-force).<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp Death was instantaneous for all passengers and crew due to the impact forces and deceleration.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
In-flight entertainment networkEdit
Both first and business class seats were equipped with a Windows NT 4.0 based In-Flight Entertainment Network (IFEN) system with touchscreen in-seat video displays and magnetic card readers.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" /> In the galley, a cabin file server served as a central hub for managing content, which facilitated movie downloads, stored flight and casino information, and collected credit card data transmitted from each seat.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
The original system design provided IFEN to all 257 seats. Originally, the IFEN was to be powered from the cabin power distribution, but it could not deliver enough power for the complete IFEN setup intended for the 257-seat configuration. As a result, 115-volt three-phase 400 Hz AC Bus 2, located in the cockpit area (the origin of the fire), was used to provide most of the IFEN power requirements. In April 1997 IFEN configuration was reduced only to 61 first and business class seats.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" /> Template:Rp
By design, AC Bus 2 remained active even when the "CABIN BUS" switch was turned off. The purpose of using the "CABIN BUS" switch, which was the first step in Swissair's "Smoke/Fumes of Unknown Origin" checklist during the incident, was to cut off most electrical power to the aircraft cabin, which was not helpful in the system design where IFEN was connected to AC Bus 2.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp
Former employees of Interactive Flight Technologies, the company that manufactured the IFEN, conceded that each entertainment system box which processed all information for the passenger interface was positioned under each passenger seat and emitted excessive heat. Others raised concerns that extended to the high power consumption and overall heat generation of the system.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name=":4">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name=":3">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Installation of IFEN at Swissair was rushed and violated various FAA certification procedures.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> According to Swissair Operational Engineering, IFEN added more than Template:Convert of weight to the plane.<ref name=":2">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Safety recommendationsEdit
The TSB made nine recommendations relating to changes in aircraft materials (testing, certification, inspection, and maintenance), electrical systems, and flight data capture, as both flight recorders had stopped when they lost power six minutes before impact. General recommendations were also made regarding improvements in checklists and in fire-detection and fire-fighting equipment and training.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> These recommendations led to widespread changes in Federal Aviation Administration standards, principally affecting wiring and fire hardening.<ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
LegacyEdit
ValuablesEdit
The plane's manifest indicated the presence of a significant amount of valuables, including 2 pounds of diamonds from ''Nature of Diamonds'' exhibition<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> at the American Museum of Natural History, 4 pounds of watches, 10 pounds of jewelry, and 49 kilograms of cash intended for a U.S. bank in Geneva.<ref name=":0">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name=":1">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Insurer Lloyd's of London reportedly paid out an estimated $300 million for the lost diamonds and jewels. The company applied for a treasure-trove license from the Nova Scotia government to search the crash site but faced opposition from victims' relatives, leading to the withdrawal of the application.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name=":1" />
Following the crash, a Template:Convert exclusion zone was established around the site and maintained for over a year to secure the scene. Despite restrictions, concerns arose regarding potential unauthorized attempts to search for valuables. Halifax-based TV documentary producer John Wesley Chisholm suggested that treasure hunters might have covertly explored the area in the years following the crash.<ref name=":0" />
Lost worksEdit
Two paintings, including Le Peintre (The Painter) by Pablo Picasso, were on board the aircraft and were destroyed in the accident.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> At the time, The Painter painting's value was estimated at $1.5 million.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
LawsuitEdit
In September 1999, Swissair, Delta Air Lines, and Boeing (who had acquired McDonnell Douglas through a merger in 1997) agreed to share liability for the accident and offered the families of the passengers financial compensation.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The offer was rejected in favour of a $19.8 billion suit against Swissair and DuPont, the supplier of the Mylar insulation sheathing. A US federal court ruled against punitive damages in February 2002. The resulting compensations for one group of plaintiffs totaled over $13 million.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Memorials and tributesEdit
A non-denominational memorial service was held on the grounds of East St. Margaret's Elementary School in Indian Harbour on 9 September 1998. Among those in attendance were 175 relatives of the crash victims, Swiss president Flavio Cotti, Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien, and Nova Scotia premier Russell MacLellan.<ref name="memorial">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> A memorial service was also held in Zürich on 11 September 1998.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The following year, another memorial was held in Nova Scotia.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Two memorials to those who died in the crash were established by the Government of Nova Scotia. One is to the east of the crash site at The Whalesback, a promontory Template:Convert north of Peggy's Cove.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The second is a more private, but much larger commemoration located west of the crash site near Bayswater Beach Provincial Park on the Aspotogan Peninsula in Bayswater.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Here, the unidentified remains of the victims are interred. A fund was established to maintain the memorials and the government passed an act to recognize the memorials.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Various other charitable funds were also created, including one in the name of a young victim from Louisiana, Robert Martin Maillet, which provided money for children in need,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }} </ref> and one in the name of Robert's mother, Karen E. Maillet-Domingue (also a victim), which granted scholarships.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Aftermath and effects on the industryEdit
After the crash of Flight 111, the flight designator for Swissair's New York–Geneva route was changed to SR139, although the route was still operated by MD-11 aircraft. The crash of Flight 111 was a severe blow to Swissair and the airline suffered even more loss following the accident, particularly as the in-flight entertainment system that was blamed for causing the accident had been installed on the aircraft to attract more passengers. It was disconnected following the Transportation Safety Board discovery on 29 October 1998 and eventually removed on both Swissair fleets of 15 MD-11 and 3 Boeing 747.<ref name=":4" /><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="A98H0003 Final Report" />Template:Rp<ref name=":2" /><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Swissair later went bankrupt shortly after the September 11 attacks in 2001, an event that caused a significant and widespread disruption to the aviation transportation industry.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Following the bankruptcy of Swissair in 2001, their international traffic rights were passed to Crossair who took over Swissair's route network and fleet and began operating flights as the newly renamed Swiss International Air Lines, changing the flight designator for the New York–Geneva route to LX023. The MD-11 was retired from the Swiss fleet in 2004, and the flight today is operated by an Airbus A330-300.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
See alsoEdit
- Aviation accidents and incidents
- South African Airways Flight 295 – another aviation accident which occurred due to inflight fire
- EgyptAir Flight 804 – another case of fire in the cockpit
NotesEdit
ReferencesEdit
Further readingEdit
- Template:Citation – French version available here
- Template:Cite book
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External linksEdit
Template:Sister project Template:External media
- Detailed report about the crash on Austrian Wings (German, published on 2 September 2013)
- Swissair – Information about the accident of SR111 – Swissair (Template:Webarchive)
- Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigation report (PDF)
- Esquire July 2000 report "The Long Fall of One-Eleven Heavy" highlighting the human side of the accident
- Lloyd's of London
- "Lloyd's statement regarding Swissair crash site license application." Friday 19 May 2000. (Archive)
- "Lloyd's statement regarding the Swissair crash site." Tuesday 23 May 2000. (Archive)
- Cockpit Voice Recorder transcript and accident summary on tailstrike.com Template:Webarchive
- Swissair Flight 111 memorial site (Archive)
- Swissair profile CNN (Archive)
- Swissair crash warning to airlines, BBC
Template:Aviation accidents and incidents in Canada Template:Aviation incidents and accidents in 1998 Template:In-flight fires Template:Authority control