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Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps

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File:新疆生产建设兵团第八师150团12连连部.jpg
12th company, 150th regiment, 8th division, Xinjiang production and Construction Corps

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (新疆生产建设兵团; abbreviated as 新疆兵团, or XPCC in English), also known as Bingtuan, trading with the external name China Xinjian Group,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> is a state-owned enterprise and paramilitary organization in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The XPCC was established in 1954 under the orders of Mao Zedong, and developed sparsely populated areas in its early decades, taking the model of the traditional tuntian system of setting military units in frontier areas. The XPCC was severely damaged during the Cultural Revolution, and was outright abolished in 1975, before being re-established in 1981, partly due to the Soviet-Afghan War. It re-established its economic dominance over Xinjiang afterwards, also being responsible for maintenance against the "three evils" (separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism). In its history, the XPCC has built farms, towns, and cities, provided land and employment to disbanded military units, and re-settled Han migrants from other parts of China in what has been called a campaign of assimilation and Sinicization of the local Uyghur population.

The XPCC operates cities, where it provides prisons, healthcare, policing, judiciary, and education, and has stakes in numerous publicly traded companies. It is extensively involved in economic, political and military affairs of Xinjiang, being called a "state in a state".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

HistoryEdit

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The XPCC draws from the traditional Chinese tuntian system, a policy of settling military units in frontier areas so that they become self-sufficient in food, and similar policies in the Tang and Qing dynasties.<ref name="Rossabi"/> Construction corps were set up for sparsely populated frontier regions, including Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang.

After the Chinese Communist Party took control of Xinjiang in 1949, People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces deployed into Xinjiang were commanded to start production in the area. In 1953, PLA there were separated into National Defense and Production Divisions. XPCC was formed from soldiers from First Field Army, Kuomintang,<ref name="Rossabi" /> and from the local Ili National Army.<ref name="O'Neill">Template:Cite news</ref>

In October 1954 the Production Division was ordered by the Mao Zedong to form People's Liberation Army Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, tasked to "Integrate labor with violent, colonize and populate the frontier" in 1954.<ref name="XPCCwhitepaper">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="Gao">"Tao Zhiyue 1892 – 1988)" in James Z. Gao: Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800–1949), p. 358, 2009, Scarecrow Press</ref><ref>Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps: Key Policy Tool from Mao to Xi Template:Webarchive Andrew Erickson, 16 November 2019</ref> XPCC was founded by Wang Zhen. It initially comprised 175,000 military personnel, led by Tao Zhiyue as its first commander.<ref name="O'Neill" />

XPCC was initially focused on settling, cultivating, and developing sparsely populated areas, such as the fringes of the Taklamakan Desert and the Gurbantünggüt Desert, under the principle of "not competing for benefits with the local people".<ref name="ix">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> It provided a reserve military force, although they were not called upon.<ref name="O'Neill" /><ref name="Rossabi" /> XPCC was expanded by youth from other parts of China, to equalize its sex ratio and include members with better education. In 1962, after the Sino-Soviet split, rioting occurred in Yining and 60,000 ethnic minorities living near the border fled to the Soviet Union. The Chinese government feared that the USSR was trying to destabilize China<ref name="Rossabi" /> and start a war.<ref name="O'Neill" /> XPCC was ordered to cultivate the farms of the exiles.<ref name="O'Neill" />

The XPCC was severely damaged by the Cultural Revolution. In 1975 it was abolished completely. Its powers were transferred to the government of Xinjiang and regional authorities.<ref name="ix" /> After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, and the Islamic movements gained force, fears of Soviet encirclement and Islamic fundamentalism led to the re-establishment of the XPCC in 1981<ref name="ix" /> as well as the cultivation of frontier lands and economic development.<ref name="ix" /> During the 1990s, XPCC began to contribute significantly to Xinjiang's economy, producing 40% of the region's cotton in 1997.<ref name="NB2000">Template:Cite journal</ref> After 2008, as a result of improvements in farm mechanization, students were no longer compelled to pick the cotton crop.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Starting in the 1980s, a stated task has been to prevent and break down "destructive activities of the three forces", (separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism), in order to protect social stability and national unity.<ref name="XPCCwhitepaper" /> In 2012, XPCC generated 11.1 billion yuan from the 37 settlements they control, "allowing the Corps to spread advanced culture and Chinese culture, while taking in and infusing culture of ethnic minority in Xinjiang".<ref name="XPCCwhitepaper" />

At the end of the 20th century, XPCC's military role was given instead to the Xinjiang Military District, a part of the current Western Theater Command that includes all of western China. XPCC military personnel are mostly reservists or militia.Template:Citation needed

SanctionsEdit

United StatesEdit

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XPCC was sanctioned by the United States in 2020, citing alleged human rights abuses. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Commissioner Nury Turkel remarked, "Now, no business can claim ignorance of China's oppression of the Uyghur people. We hope the sanctions signal to other Chinese officials that there are costs associated with taking part in the Communist Party's repression of religion. The world is watching and we know which officials and entities are responsible for the abuses against the Uyghur people."<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Turkel added:

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In July 2020, the United States announced Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on XPCC in connection with human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="keygroup">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name=":3">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> XPCC was alleged to run many internment camps,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> as well as implementing the CCP's efforts to settle ethnic Han in the region.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name=":3" />

In December 2020, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection announced that XPCC-produced cotton and cotton products would be prohibited from import into the U.S. due to forced labor concerns.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> In June 2021, the United States Department of Commerce placed XPCC on the Bureau of Industry and Security's Entity List.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

CanadaEdit

Following the U.S. footsteps, Global Affairs Canada imposed sanctions against the XPCC in January 2021 due to human rights abuses.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

European UnionEdit

In March 2021, the Council of the European Union listed the XPCC public security bureau as an entity subject to restrictive measures.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The reason given for this listing was that this entity is "responsible for serious human rights violations, in particular large-scale arbitrary detentions and degrading treatment inflicted upon Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities".<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Organization and functionEdit

The XPCC is a ministerial-level institution under the State Council and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region regional government.<ref name=":4">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> It has administrative authority over medium-sized cities, settlements and farms in Xinjiang. It provides services such as healthcare, policing, judiciary, and education. Nominally subject to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, its internal affairs, including city and reclaimed land administration, are separate from that of the Autonomous Region and under direct control of the central government. The XPCC has been described to operate as a "state within a state"<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name=":2">Murphy, L and Elimä, N. (2021). "In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour and Global Solar Supply Chains."  Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Hallam University Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice</ref> and has been considered by scholars as acting as a de facto prefecture-level governmental entity.<ref name=":2" />

The XPCC's internal affairs, including the administration of its cities and reclaimed land, is separate from that of the Autonomous Region and under direct control of the central government.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> It has sub-provincial powers on par with sub-provincial cities. The XPCC is headed by the Party Secretary of Xinjiang, who is "executive political commissar" ex officio. The XPCC's own party secretary, usually a ministerial-level official,<ref name=":4" /> typically concurrently serves as its political commissar and acts as its highest day-to-day authority, and is considered to be the second most-powerful person in Xinjiang after the CCP secretary.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Additionally XPCC has a commander, usually a deputy-ministerial level official.<ref name=":4" />

Headquartered in Ürümqi, XPCC is subdivided into divisions, then regiments. Each XPCC division corresponds to a prefecture-level administrative division, and are in themselves of sub-prefectural rank. In addition to regiments, the XPCC also administers regiment-level farms and ranches ({{#invoke:Lang|lang}}). Frontier regiment farms (边疆农场) served a secondary function of preventing defection and were created along the border after the Yi–Ta incident in 1962.<ref name="Lei 2016">Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Template:Cite thesis</ref><ref name="Mao 2017">Template:Cite thesis</ref> XPCC and each individual division are headed by three leaders: a first political commissar, a political commissar, and a commander. The first political commissars of each XPCC division are their committee secretaries.Template:Cn

Administrative structureEdit

The XPCC's 14 divisions which are then subdivided into 185 regiment-level entities (including regiments, farms, and ranches), scattered throughout Xinjiang, mostly in previously unpopulated or sparsely populated areas.

The divisions are:

Name Founded Location (approximate) Headquarters
1st Division 1953 Aksu Prefecture Aral
2nd Division 1953 Bayingolin Autonomous Prefecture Tiemenguan
3rd Division 1966 Kashgar Prefecture Tumxuk
4th Division 1953 Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture
(southern, directly administered portion)		 Kokdala
5th Division 1953 Bortala Autonomous Prefecture Shuanghe
6th Division 1953 Changji Autonomous Prefecture Wujiaqu
7th Division 1953 Ili Autonomous Prefecture
and Karamay		 Huyanghe
8th Division 1953 area east of Karamay Shihezi
9th Division 1962 Tacheng Prefecture Emin County
10th Division 1959 Altay Prefecture Beitun
11th Division
the former Construction Division		 1953 Ürümqi Xinshi, Ürümqi
12th Division 1982 Ürümqi Ürümqi
13th Division 1982 Hami Hami
14th Division 1982 Hotan Prefecture Kunyu

In May 1953, the PLA's 25th, 26th and 27th Divisions from the 9th Corps were reorganized as 7th, 8th and 9th Agriculture Construction Division of the XPCC, respectively.Template:Citation needed

SettlementsEdit

The XPCC has settled Han in Xinjiang<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> and has built eleven medium-sized cities during its history, and now controls ten of them.<ref name=":0">Template:Cite news</ref> The governments of these cities are combined entirely with the division that controls them. For example, the division headquarters is the same entity as the city government, the division political commissar the same person as the city committee secretary, the division commander the same person as the city's mayor, and so forth. Ten XPCC-administered cities are nominally listed as "sub-prefectural-level cities" of Xinjiang, but the local government is usually not involved in the administration of these cities.

Name Dates of official
designation as a "city"		 Governing period Division
Kuytun<ref name="O'Neill"/> 奎屯市 August 29, 1975 1953–1975 7th
↳ Tianbei New Area 天北新区 – 2002–2019
Shihezi<ref name="ix"/> 石河子市 January 2, 1976 1953–1975, 1980–present 8th
Aral 阿拉尔市 January 19, 2004 1953–1975, 1980–present 1st
Wujiaqu<ref name="ix"/> 五家渠市 January 19, 2004 1953–1975, 1980–present 6th
Tumxuk 图木舒克市 January 19, 2004 1966–1975, 1980–present 3rd
Beitun 北屯市 November 28, 2011 2002–present 10th
Tiemenguan 铁门关市 December 30, 2012 2002–present 2nd
Shuanghe 双河市 February 26, 2014 2002–present 5th
Kokdala 可克达拉市 March 18, 2015 2003–present 4th
Kunyu 昆玉市 January 20, 2016 2003–present 14th
Huyanghe 胡杨河市 December 6, 2019 2010–present 7th
Xinxing 新星市 February 4, 2021 2010–present 13th
Baiyang 白杨市 January 20, 2023 2010–present 9th
Beiting 北亭市 TBD 2010–present 12th

DemographicsEdit

Template:Update XPCC is predominantly composed of Chinese citizens of Han ethnicity.<ref name=":4" /> While the Han are by far the largest group of XPCC workers, their relative numbers have declined: from 1980 to 1993 the overall population remained constant, while Han membership declined slightly from 90% to 88%.<ref name="Rossabi">Template:Cite book</ref>

Ethnic groups in XPCC, 2002 estimate<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation CitationClass=web

}}</ref>

Nationality Population Percentage
Han 2,204,500 88.1
Uyghur 165,000 6.6
Hui 64,700 2.6
Kazakh 42,700 1.7
Mongol 6,200 0.3
Others 18,100 0.7

Economic activityEdit

XPCC created many publicly traded subsidiary companies.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> XPCC uses the name "China Xinjian Group" for its economic activities.<ref name="ix" /> XPCC plays an outsized role in Xinjiang's economy, with the organization producing [[Renminbi|Template:CNY]] (Template:US$), or around 19.7% of Xinjiang's economy, while the per capita GDP was Template:CNY (Template:US$).<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Primary source inline The area and population of the XPCC are generally given as part of Xinjiang's total figures, but XPCC's GDP is generally reported separately.<ref name=":1">Template:Cite news</ref>

XPCC's primary economic activity remains agriculture, including cotton, fruit, vegetables, food crops, vegetable oils, and sugar beets. Important products are cotton, tomatoes, ketchup, Korla pears, Turpan grapes, and wine. In 2018 the XPCC produced 30% of China's cotton output.<ref name=":2" /> XPCC has a mix of factory farming and smaller farms. XPCC dominates Xinjiang's agriculture and controls nearly a quarter of Xinjiang's arable land.<ref name=":0" /><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> During its history, XPCC established significant mining and mining-related industries, most of which subsequently were handed over to the Xinjiang government. XPCC is also involved in tertiary industries, including trade, distribution, real estate, tourism, construction and insurance.<ref name=":0" />

SubsidiariesEdit

The XPCC has thousands of subsidiary companies. The Center for Advanced Defense Studies has identified 2,923 subsidiaries.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> Currently the XPCC has eleven publicly traded subsidiaries.Template:Citation needed They are:

|CitationClass=web }}</ref>

Education and mediaEdit

XPCC operates its own educational system covering primary, secondary and tertiary education (including two universities, Shihezi University (石河子大学) and Tarim University (塔里木大学)); its own daily newspaper, Bingtuan Daily; and its own TV stations at both provincial and division levels.Template:Citation needed

ReferencesEdit

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SourcesEdit

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External linksEdit

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