Template:Short description Template:For-multi Template:Redirect Template:Use American English Template:Use mdy dates Template:Infobox aircraft occurrence
Trans World Airlines Flight 800 (known as TW800 or TWA800) was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, United States, to Fiumicino Airport in Rome, Italy, with a stopover at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France. On July 17, 1996, at approximately 8:31Template:Spacesp.m. EDT, twelve minutes after takeoff, the Boeing 747-100 serving the flight exploded and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean near East Moriches, New York, United States.<ref name="Final Report">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Rp
All 230 people on board died in the crash; it is the third-deadliest aviation accident in U.S. history. Accident investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) traveled to the scene, arriving the following morning<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp amid speculation that a terrorist attack was the cause of the crash.<ref name="CNN 19Jul96">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="NYT 24Jul96">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Time Mag 29Jul96">Template:Cite magazine</ref> The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and New York Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) initiated a parallel criminal investigation.<ref name="CNN 19Jul96(2)">Template:Cite news</ref> Sixteen months later, the JTTF announced that no evidence of a criminal act had been found and closed its active investigation.<ref name="CNN 18Nov97">Template:Cite news</ref>
The four-year NTSB investigation concluded with the approval of the Aircraft Accident Report on August 23, 2000, ending the most extensive, complex, and costly air disaster investigation in U.S. history up to that time.<ref name="NTSB Board Meeting II-4">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="CIA Report 14Aug08">Template:Cite news</ref> The report's conclusion was that the probable cause of the accident was the explosion of flammable fuel vapors in the center fuel tank. Although it could not be determined with certainty, the likely ignition source was a short circuit.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Problems with the aircraft's wiring were found, including evidence of arcing in the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) wiring that enters the tank. The FQIS on Flight 800 is known to have been malfunctioning; the captain remarked about "crazy" readings from the system about two minutes and 30 seconds before the aircraft exploded. As a result of the investigation, new requirements were developed for aircraft to prevent future fuel-tank explosions.<ref name="SeattlePI 16Jul08">Template:Cite news</ref>
AccidentEdit
{{#invoke:Hatnote|hatnote}} Template:Multiple image On the day of the accident, the airplane departed from Ellinikon International Airport in Athens, Greece, as TWA Flight 881 and arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport at about 4:38 p.m. The aircraft was then refueled and the crew was changed.
The crew was led by 58-year-old Captain Ralph G. Kevorkian, who had flown for TWA for 31 years and the U.S. Air Force for nine years and had logged 18,700 flight hours, including 5,490 on the Boeing 747. Captain/check airman Steven E. Snyder, 57, had flown for TWA for 32 years and had logged 17,200 flight hours, including 4,700 on the Boeing 747. Flight engineer/check airman Richard G. Campbell Jr., 63, had flown for TWA for 30 years and the U.S. Air Force for 12 years and had logged 18,500 flight hours, including 3,800 on the Boeing 747. Also with the crew was 25-year-old flight engineer trainee Oliver Krick, who previously served as a business pilot for four years and had 2,520 flight hours, including 30 on the Boeing 747. Krick had flown for TWA for 26 days and was starting the sixth leg of his initial operating experience training.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Flight 800 was actually a training flight for Kevorkian, and he was seated in the captain's (left) seat. Captain Snyder was seated in the first officer's (right) seat monitoring Kevorkian's progress. Flight Engineer Campbell was seated in the cockpit jump seat. Flight engineer trainee Krick was seated in the flight engineer's seat being monitored by Campbell.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp<ref name="TWA Press Release">Template:Cite press release</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The NTSB Final Report gives Oliver Krick's age as being 24,<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp but the TWA press release gives 25 (TWA was correct, as Krick turned 25 on July 14, three days before the crash).<ref name="TWA Press Release"/>
The Cabin Crew team of 15 consisted of Flight Service Manager Jacques Charbonnier (65) with 36 years' service at TWA, Flight Attendants Arlene Johnson (60) with 36 years' service, Connie Charbonnier (49) with 27 years' service, Maureen Lockhart (49) with 26 years' service, Marit Rhoads (48) with 26 years' service, Melinda Torche (46) with 26 years' service, Janet Christopher (47) with 26 years' service, Debra Diluccio (47) with 25 years' service, Mike Schuldt (51) with 23 years' service, Grace Melotin (48) with 23 years' service, Sandra Meade (42) with 21 years' service, Ray Lang (51) with 20 years' service, Dan Callas (21) with 3 months' service, and Jill Zienkiewicz (23) with 2 months' service.<ref>Template:Cite AV media</ref>
The ground-maintenance crew locked out the thrust reverser for engine No. 3 (treated as a minimum equipment list item) because of technical problems with the thrust reverser sensors during the landing of TWA 881 at JFK, before Flight 800's departure. Additionally, severed cables for the engine’s thrust reverser were replaced.<ref name="DCA-96-MA-070">Template:Cite journal</ref> During refueling of the aircraft, the volumetric shutoff (VSO) control was believed to have been triggered before the tanks were full. To continue the pressure fueling, a TWA mechanic overrode the automatic VSO by pulling the volumetric fuse and an overflow circuit breaker. Maintenance records indicate that the aircraft had numerous VSO-related maintenance writeups in the weeks before the accident.<ref name="Final Report" />Template:Rp
TWA 800 was scheduled to depart JFK for Charles de Gaulle Airport around 7:00 p.m., but the flight’s pushback was delayed until 8:02 p.m. by a disabled piece of ground equipment and a passenger/baggage mismatch.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp After the owner of the baggage in question was confirmed to be on board, the flight crew prepared for departure, and the aircraft pushed back from Gate 27 at the TWA Flight Center. The flight crew started the engines at 8:04 p.m. However, because of the previous maintenance undertaken on engine No. 3, the flight crew only started engines No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4. Engine No. 3 was started 10 minutes later during taxi at 8:14 p.m. The initial departure was uneventful, with the 747 taking off from Runway 22R five minutes later at 8:19 p.m.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
TWA 800 then received a series of heading changes and generally increasing altitude assignments as it climbed to its intended cruising altitude.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Weather in the area was light winds with scattered clouds,<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp with dusk lighting conditions.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The last radio transmission from the airplane occurred at 8:30 p.m., when the flight crew received and then acknowledged instructions from Boston Center to climb to Template:Convert.<ref name="CVR Report">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Rp<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> The last recorded radar transponder return from the airplane was recorded by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar site at Trevose, Pennsylvania, at 8:31:12 p.m.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Thirty-eight seconds later, David McClaine, the captain of Eastwind Airlines Flight 507, a Boeing 737-221 registered N221US (which had suffered a near-crash of its own a month prior)<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> reported to Boston ARTCC that he "just saw an explosion out here", adding, "we just saw an explosion up ahead of us here ... about Template:Convert or something like that, it just went down… into the water."<ref name=":0">Template:Cite journal</ref> Subsequently, many air traffic control facilities in the New York and Long Island areas received reports of an explosion from other pilots operating in the area.<ref name=":0" /> Many witnesses in the vicinity of the crash stated that they saw or heard explosions, accompanied by a large fireball(s) over the ocean, and observed debris, some of which was burning while falling into the water.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Various civilian, military, and police vessels reached the crash site within minutes of the initial water impact. They searched for survivors but found none,<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp making TWA 800 the second-deadliest aircraft accident in United States history at that time, only exceeded by American Airlines Flight 191.<ref name="ASN">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
BackgroundEdit
AircraftEdit
The aircraft involved, manufactured in July 1971, was a Boeing 747-131 registered as N93119 with serial number 20083. It had completed 16,869 flights in 93,303 hours of operation and was powered by four Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7AH turbofan engines.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="Final Report" />Template:Rp
CrewEdit
| Nationality | Passengers | Crew | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| France | 40 | Template:N/a | 40 |
| Ivory Coast | 1 | Template:N/a | 1 |
| Germany | 1 | Template:N/a | 1 |
| Israel | 1 | Template:N/a | 1 |
| Italy | 7 | 1 | 8 |
| Norway | 2 | Template:N/a | 2 |
| Spain | 2 | Template:N/a | 2 |
| Sweden | 1 | Template:N/a | 1 |
| Portugal | 5 | Template:N/a | 5 |
| United States | 152 | 17 | 169 |
| Total | 212 | 18 | 230<ref name=count/> |
On board TWA 800 were 230 people, including 18 crew and 20 off-duty employees,<ref name=count/> most of whom were crew meant to cover the Paris-Rome leg of the flight. Out of the 18 crew members, 17 crew members<ref name=count/> and 152 of the passengers were Americans; the remaining crew member was Italian, while the remaining passengers were of various other nationalities. Notable passengers included:<ref name="count">Template:Cite news</ref>
- Michel Breistroff, French ice hockey player
- Marcel Dadi, French guitarist
- David Hogan, American composer
- Jed Johnson, Andy Warhol's partner of twelve years, interior designer, and director
- Pam Lychner, American crime victims' rights advocate and former TWA flight attendant
- Rico Puhlmann, German fashion photographer<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation
|CitationClass=web }}</ref>
- Courtney Elizabeth Johns, sister of Geoff Johns and the inspiration for the DC Comics superhero Courtney Whitmore / Stargirl<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
- Ana Maria Shorter, Wayne Shorter's second wife,<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation
|CitationClass=web }}</ref> and the couple's niece, Dalila, daughter of singer Jon Lucien
- Jack O'Hara, executive producer of ABC Sports, along with his wife and daughter. He was going to France to supervise coverage of the Tour de France in what was to be his last assignment for the network after being let go the previous week.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation
|CitationClass=web }}</ref>
In addition, 16 students and five adult chaperones from the French Club of the Montoursville Area High School in Pennsylvania were on board.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Initial investigationEdit
The NTSB was notified at approximately 8:50 p.m. on the day of the accident. A full "go team" was assembled in Washington, D.C., and arrived on the scene early the next morning.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Meanwhile, initial witness descriptions led many to believe that the cause of the crash was a bomb or surface-to-air missile attack.<ref name="CNN Initial">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="NYT 19Jul96">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="Newsweek 29Jul96">Template:Cite news</ref> As the NTSB does not investigate criminal activity, the United States Attorney General is empowered to declare an investigation to be potentially linked to a criminal act and to require the NTSB to relinquish control of the investigation to the FBI.<ref name="Cornell1131">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> In the case of TWA 800, the FBI initiated a parallel criminal investigation alongside the NTSB's accident investigation.<ref name="NTSB Board Meeting">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Search-and-recovery operationsEdit
Search-and-recovery operations were conducted by federal, state, and local agencies, as well as by government contractors.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Personnel in an HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopter of the New York Air National Guard witnessed the explosion from about Template:Convert away and arrived at the scene of the explosion while debris was still falling into the water, forcing the crew to retreat. They reported their sighting to the tower at Suffolk County Airport. Remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), side-scan sonar and laser line-scanning equipment were employed to search for and investigate underwater debris fields. Victims and wreckage were recovered by scuba divers and ROVs. Later, scallop trawlers were used to recover wreckage embedded in the sea floor.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp In one of the largest diver-assisted salvage operations ever conducted, often working in very difficult and dangerous conditions, more than 95% of the airplane wreckage was eventually recovered.<ref name="NTSB Board Meeting"/><ref name="Riddle"/>Template:Rp The search-and-recovery effort identified three main areas of wreckage underwater, which were classified by color.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The yellow, red, and green zones contained wreckage from the front, center, and rear sections of the airplane, respectively.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The green zone with the aft portion of the aircraft was located the farthest along the flight path.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Pieces of wreckage were transported by boat to shore and then by truck to leased hangar space at the former Grumman Aircraft facility in Calverton, New York for storage, examination, and reconstruction.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The facility became the command center and headquarters for the investigation.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp NTSB and FBI personnel were present to observe all transfers to preserve the evidentiary value of the wreckage.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder were recovered by U.S. Navy divers one week after the accident, and the machines were immediately shipped to the NTSB laboratory in Washington, D.C. for analysis.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The victims' remains were transported to the Suffolk County Medical Examiner's office in Hauppauge, New York.<ref name="Forensic Report">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Rp
Tensions in the investigationEdit
Relatives of TWA 800 passengers and crew, as well as the media, gathered at the Ramada Plaza JFK Hotel.<ref name="Newsweek 5Aug96">Template:Cite magazine</ref> Many waited until the remains of their family members had been recovered, identified and released.<ref name="NYT 7Aug96">Template:Cite news</ref>Template:Rp<ref name="After the Crash">Template:Cite journal "The Ramada Inn at JFK was "Crash Central," the gathering place for the 230 victims' families, as well as investigators, the TWA 'go team', and the media."</ref>Template:Rp This hotel became known as the "Heartbreak Hotel" for its role in hosting families of victims of several airliner crashes.<ref name="AdamsonPhilly">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name=CNNFamiliarTrag>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Many grieving relatives became angry because of TWA's delayed confirmation of the passenger list,<ref name="Newsweek 5Aug96"/> conflicting information from agencies and officials<ref name="NYT 25Jul96" />Template:Rp and mistrust of the recovery operation's priorities.<ref name="NYT 30Jul96">Template:Cite news</ref>Template:Rp Although NTSB vice chairman Robert Francis stated that all bodies were retrieved as soon as they were spotted and that wreckage was recovered only if divers believed that victims were hidden underneath,<ref name="NYT 30Jul96"/>Template:Rp many families were suspicious that investigators were not truthful or were withholding information.<ref name="NYT 30Jul96"/>Template:Rp<ref name="NYT 23Aug96">Template:Cite news</ref>Template:Rp<ref name="NYT 25Jul96">Template:Cite news</ref>Template:Rp
Anger and political pressure were also directed at Suffolk County medical examiner Charles V. Wetli as recovered bodies backlogged at the morgue.<ref name="Riddle">Template:Cite magazine</ref>Template:Rp<ref name="NYT 23Aug96"/>Template:Rp<ref name="NYT 25Jul96"/>Template:Rp Under constant pressure to identify victims with minimal delay,<ref name="Forensic Report"/>Template:Rp pathologists worked long hours. While some victims' bodies were generally intact, most others were burned, fragmented, skeletonized, or decaying, necessitating identification using DNA testing and dental records.<ref name="NYT 23Aug96"/>Template:Rp As the primary objective was to identify all remains rather than to perform detailed forensic autopsies, the thoroughness of the examinations was highly variable.<ref name="Forensic Report"/>Template:Rp Ultimately, the remains of all 230 victims were recovered and identified, and the final victim identification occurred more than 10 months after the crash.<ref name="Forensic Report"/>Template:Rp
With lines of authority unclear, differences in agendas and culture between the FBI and NTSB resulted in discord.<ref name="NYT 23Aug96"/>Template:Rp The FBI, assuming that a criminal act had occurred,<ref name="NYT 23Aug96"/>Template:Rp saw the NTSB as indecisive. Expressing frustration at the NTSB's unwillingness to speculate on a cause, one FBI agent described the NTSB as "No opinions. No nothing."<ref name="NYT 23Aug96"/>Template:Rp Meanwhile, the NTSB was required to refute or minimize speculation about conclusions and evidence, frequently supplied to reporters by law-enforcement officials and politicians.<ref name="Riddle"/>Template:Rp<ref name="NYT 23Aug96"/>Template:Rp The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, an invited party to the NTSB investigation, criticized the undocumented removal by FBI agents of wreckage from the hangar where it was stored.<ref name="iamaw report">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
Witness interviewsEdit
Although considerable discrepancies existed among the many witness accounts, most had seen a "streak of light," described by 38 of 258 witnesses as ascending,<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp moving to a point where a large fireball appeared. Several witnesses reported that the fireball divided into two parts as it descended toward the water.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Intense public interest arose regarding the witness reports, as did much speculation that the reported streak of light was a missile that had struck TWA 800, causing the airplane to explode.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp These witness accounts were a major reason for the initiation and duration of the FBI's criminal investigation.<ref name="Witness Report">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Rp
Approximately 80 FBI agents conducted interviews with potential witnesses daily.<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp No verbatim records of the witness interviews were produced; instead, the agents who conducted the interviews wrote summaries that they then submitted.<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp Witnesses were not asked to review or correct the summaries.<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp Included in some of the witness summaries were drawings or diagrams of what the witnesses had observed.<ref name="Witness Appendix E">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Rp<ref name="Witness Appendix B">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Rp
Within days of the crash, the NTSB announced its intent to form its own witness group and to interview witnesses to the crash.<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp After the FBI raised concerns about nongovernmental parties in the NTSB's investigation having access to this information and possible prosecutorial difficulties resulting from multiple interviews of the same witnesses,<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp the NTSB deferred and did not interview witnesses. A safety board investigator later reviewed FBI interview notes and briefed other board investigators on their contents. In November 1996, the FBI agreed to allow the NTSB access to summaries of witness accounts in which personally identifying information had been redacted and to conduct a limited number of witness interviews. In April 1998, the FBI provided the NTSB with the identities of the witnesses, but because of the time that had elapsed, a decision was made to rely on the original FBI documents rather than on reinterviewed witnesses.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Further investigation and analysisEdit
Examination of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder data showed a normal takeoff and climb,<ref name="CVR Report"/>Template:Rp with the aircraft in normal flight<ref name="NTSB FDR">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Rp before both abruptly stopped at 8:31:12 p.m.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp At 8:29:15 p.m., Captain Kevorkian was heard to say, "Look at that crazy fuel flow indicator there on number four... see that?"<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp A loud noise recorded on the last few tenths of a second of the CVR was similar to the last noises recorded from other airplanes that had experienced in-flight breakups.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp This, together with the distribution of wreckage and witness reports, indicated a sudden, catastrophic in-flight breakup of TWA 800.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Possible causes of the in-flight breakupEdit
Investigators considered several possible causes for the structural breakup: structural failure and decompression, detonation of a high-energy explosive device such as a missile warhead exploding either upon impact with the airplane or just before impact, a bomb exploding inside the airplane or a fuel-air explosion in the center-wing fuel tank.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Structural failure and decompressionEdit
Close examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of structural faults such as fatigue, corrosion, or mechanical damage that could have caused the in-flight breakup.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The breakup could have been initiated by an in-flight separation of the forward cargo door as had occurred in the Turkish Airlines Flight 981 or United Airlines Flight 811 accidents, but all evidence indicated that the door was closed and locked at impact.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The NTSB concluded that "the in-flight breakup of TWA flight 800 was not initiated by a pre-existing condition resulting in a structural failure and decompression."<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Missile or bomb detonationEdit
A review of recorded data from long-range and airport surveillance radars revealed multiple contacts of airplanes or objects in TWA 800's vicinity at the time of the accident.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp None of these contacts intersected TWA 800's position at any time.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Attention was drawn to data from the Islip, New York ARTCC facility that showed three tracks in the vicinity of TWA 800 that did not appear in any of the other radar data.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp None of these sequences intersected TWA 800's position at any time.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp None of the reviewed data showed radar returns consistent with a missile or other projectile traveling toward TWA 800.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
The NTSB addressed allegations that the Islip radar data showed groups of military surface targets converging suspiciously in an area around the accident and that an unidentified 30-knot radar track, Template:Convert from the crash site, was involved in foul play, as evidenced by its failure to divert from its course and assist with the search-and-rescue operations.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Military records examined by the NTSB showed no military surface vessels within Template:Convert of TWA 800 at the time of the accident.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp In addition, the records indicated that the closest area scheduled for military use, warning area W-387A/B, was Template:Convert south.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
The NTSB reviewed the 30-knot target track to determine why it had not diverted from its course to proceed to the area where the TWA 800 wreckage had fallen. TWA 800 was behind the target, and with the target's occupants likely looking forward, they would not have been in a position to observe the aircraft's breakup, subsequent explosions, or fireballs.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The occupants of the target track were unlikely to have been able to hear the explosions over the sound of their craft's engines and the noise of the hull traveling through water, especially if the occupants were in an enclosed bridge or cabin.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Further, review of the Islip radar data for similar summer days and nights in 1999 indicated that the 30-knot track was consistent with normal commercial fishing, recreational, and cargo-vessel traffic. The identification of the 30-knot target track was never identified.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
- Recorded radar data
- Figure25.PNG
Radar data showing vehicle and/or object tracks within Template:Convert of TWA flight 800 just before the accident.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
- Figure27.PNG
Three sequences of primary returns near TWA 800 that were only recorded by the Islip radar.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
- Radar 45.PNG
Primary radar returns that appeared near the TWA 800 after 8:31:12 p.m.: The 30-knot track is at the bottom center of the image.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Trace amounts of explosive residue were detected on three samples of material from three separate locations of the recovered airplane wreckage (described by the FBI as a piece of canvas-like material and two pieces of a floor panel).<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp These samples were submitted to the FBI's laboratory in Washington, D.C., which determined that one sample contained traces of cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX), another nitroglycerin and the third a combination of RDX and pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp these findings received much media attention.<ref name="NYT Explosives">Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="CNN Explosives">Template:Cite news</ref> In addition, the backs of several damaged passenger seats were observed bearing an unknown red/brown-shaded substance.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp According to the seat manufacturer, the locations and appearance of the substance were consistent with adhesive used in the construction of the seats, and additional laboratory testing by NASA identified the substance as consistent with adhesives.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Further examination of the airplane structure, seats, and other interior components found no damage typically associated with a high-energy explosion of a bomb or missile warhead ("severe pitting, cratering, petalling or hot-gas washing").<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp This included the pieces on which trace amounts of explosives were found.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Of the 5% of the fuselage that was not recovered, none of the missing areas was large enough to have covered all of the damage that would have been caused by the detonation of a bomb or missile.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp None of the victims' remains showed any evidence of injuries that could have been caused by high-energy explosives.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
The NTSB considered the possibility that the explosive residue was the result of contamination from the aircraft's use in transporting troops during the Gulf War in 1991 or its use in a dog-training explosive-detection exercise about one month before the accident.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Testing conducted by the FAA's Technical Center indicated that residues of the type of explosives found on the wreckage would dissipate completely after two days of immersion in seawater (nearly all recovered wreckage was immersed longer than two days).<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The NTSB concluded that it was "quite possible" that the explosive residue detected was transferred from military ships, ground vehicles, or the clothing and boots of military personnel onto the wreckage during or after the recovery operation, and that the residue was not present when the aircraft crashed into the water.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Although it was unable to determine the exact source of the trace amounts of explosive residue found in the wreckage, the lack of any other corroborating evidence associated with a high-energy explosion led the NTSB to conclude that "the in-flight breakup of TWA flight 800 was not initiated by a bomb or missile strike."<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Fuel-air explosion in the center wing fuel tankEdit
To evaluate the sequence of structural breakup of the airplane, the NTSB formed the Sequencing Group,<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp which examined individual pieces of the recovered structure, two-dimensional reconstructions or layouts of sections of the airplane and various-sized three-dimensional reconstructions of portions of the aircraft.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp In addition, the locations of pieces of wreckage at the time of recovery and differences in fire effects on pieces that are normally adjacent to each other were evaluated.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The Sequencing Group concluded that the first event in the breakup sequence was a fracture in the wing center section of the aircraft caused by an "overpressure event" in the center-wing fuel tank (CWT).<ref name="NTSB Seq p.29">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Rp An overpressure event was defined as a rapid increase in pressure resulting in failure of the structure of the CWT.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Because no evidence was found that an explosive device detonated in this (or any other) area of the airplane, the overpressure event could only have been caused by a fuel-air explosion in the CWT.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp There were Template:Convert of fuel in the CWT of TWA 800;<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> tests recreating the flight conditions showed the combination of liquid fuel and fuel-air vapor to be flammable.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp A major reason for the flammability of the fuel-air vapor in the CWT of the 747 was the large amount of heat generated and transferred to the CWT by air-conditioning packs located directly below the tank;<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp with the CWT temperature raised to a sufficient level, a single ignition source could cause an explosion.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Computer modeling<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp and scale-model testing<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp were used to predict and demonstrate how an explosion would progress in a 747 CWT. During this time, quenching was identified as an issue, a phenomenon in which the explosion would extinguish itself as it passed through the complex structure of the CWT.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Because the research data regarding quenching were limited, a complete understanding of quenching behavior was not possible, and the issue of quenching remained unresolved.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
To better determine whether a fuel-air vapor explosion in the CWT would generate sufficient pressure to break apart the fuel tank and lead to the destruction of the airplane, tests were conducted in July and August 1997 using a retired Air France 747 at Bruntingthorpe Airfield, England. These tests simulated a fuel-air explosion in the CWT by igniting a propane-air mixture, which failed the tank structure from overpressure.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp While the NTSB acknowledged that the test conditions at Bruntingthorpe were not fully comparable to the conditions that existed on TWA 800,<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp previous fuel explosions in the CWTs of commercial airliners such as those of Avianca Flight 203 and Philippine Airlines Flight 143 confirmed that a CWT explosion could break apart the fuel tank and lead to the destruction of an airplane.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Ultimately, based on "the accident airplane's breakup sequence; wreckage damage characteristics; scientific tests and research on fuels, fuel tank explosions, and the conditions in the CWT at the time of the accident; and analysis of witness information,"<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp the NTSB concluded that "the TWA flight 800 in-flight breakup was initiated by a fuel/air explosion in the CWT."<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
In-flight breakup sequence and crippled flightEdit
- Debris fields
- TWA Flight 800 zones.png
Map showing the locations of the red, yellow, and green zones<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
- Twa 800 fig 22b.PNG
Wreckage found in each zone corresponded to specific areas of the aircraft<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
- Twa 800 fig 22c.PNG
The pathways the wreckage took as it fell to the ocean<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Recovery locations of the wreckage from the ocean (the red, yellow, and green zones) clearly indicated: (1) the red area pieces (from the forward portion of the wing center section and a ring of fuselage directly in front) were the earliest pieces to separate from the airplane; (2) the forward fuselage section departed simultaneously with or shortly after the red area pieces, landing relatively intact in the yellow zone; (3) the green area pieces (wings and the aft portion of the fuselage) remained intact for a period after the separation of the forward fuselage and impacted the water in the green zone.<ref name="NTSB Seq p.29" />Template:Rp
Fire damage and soot deposits on the recovered wreckage indicated that some areas of fire existed on the airplane as it continued in crippled flight after the loss of the forward fuselage.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp After about 34 seconds (based on information from witness documents), the outer portions of both the right and left wings failed.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Shortly after, the left wing separated from what remained of the main fuselage, which resulted in further development of the fuel-fed fireballs as the pieces of wreckage fell to the ocean.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Only the FAA radar facility in North Truro, Massachusetts, using specialized processing software from the United States Air Force 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, was capable of estimating the altitude of TWA 800 after it lost power due to the CWT explosion.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Because of accuracy limitations, these radar data could not be used to determine whether the aircraft climbed after the nose separated.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Instead, the NTSB conducted a series of computer simulations to examine the flightpath of the main portion of the fuselage.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Hundreds of simulations were run using various combinations of possible times the nose of TWA 800 separated (the exact time was unknown), different models of the behavior of the crippled aircraft (the aerodynamic properties of the aircraft without its nose could only be estimated), and longitudinal radar data (the recorded radar tracks of the east/west position of TWA 800 from various sites differed).<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp These simulations indicated that after the loss of the forward fuselage the remainder of the aircraft continued in crippled flight, then pitched up while rolling to the left (north),<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp climbing to a maximum altitude between Template:Convert<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp from its last recorded altitude, Template:Convert.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Analysis of reported witness observationsEdit
At the start of the FBI's investigation, because of the possibility that international terrorists might have been involved, assistance was requested from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).<ref name="Tauss CIA report">Template:Cite journal</ref>Template:Rp CIA analysts, relying on sound-propagation analysis, concluded that the witnesses could not be describing a missile approaching an intact aircraft, but were seeing a trail of burning fuel coming from the aircraft after the initial explosion.<ref name="Tauss CIA report"/>Template:Rp This conclusion was reached after calculating how long the sound of the initial explosion took to reach the witnesses, and using that to correlate the witness observations with the accident sequence.<ref name="Tauss CIA report"/>Template:Rp In all cases, the witnesses could not be describing a missile approaching an intact aircraft, as the plane had already exploded before their observations began.<ref name="Tauss CIA report"/>Template:Rp
As the investigation progressed, the NTSB decided to form a witness group to more fully address the accounts of witnesses.<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp From November 1996 through April 1997, this group reviewed summaries of witness accounts on loan from the FBI (with personal information redacted) and conducted interviews with crewmembers from a New York Air National Guard HH-60 helicopter and C-130 airplane, as well as a U.S. Navy P-3 airplane that was flying in the vicinity of TWA 800 at the time of the accident.<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp
In February 1998, the FBI, having closed its active investigation, agreed to fully release the witness summaries to the NTSB.<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp With access to these documents no longer controlled by the FBI, the NTSB formed a second witness group to review the documents.<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp Because of the time that had elapsed (about 21 months) before the NTSB received information about the identity of the witnesses, the witness group chose not to reinterview the witnesses, but instead to rely on the original summaries of witness statements written by FBI agents as the best available evidence of the observations initially reported by the witnesses.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Despite the two and a half years that had elapsed since the accident, the witness group did interview the captain of Eastwind Airlines Flight 507, who was the first to report the explosion of TWA 800, because of his vantage point and experience as an airline pilot.<ref name="Witness Report"/>Template:Rp<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
The NTSB's review of the released witness documents determined that they contained 736 witness accounts, of which 258 were characterized as "streak of light" witnesses ("an object moving in the sky... variously described [as] a point of light, fireworks, a flare, a shooting star, or something similar.")<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The NTSB witness group concluded that the streak of light reported by witnesses might have been the actual airplane during some stage of its flight before the fireball developed, noting that most of the 258 streak-of-light accounts were generally consistent with the calculated flightpath of the accident airplane after the CWT explosion.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Thirty-eight witnesses described a streak of light that ascended vertically, or nearly so, and these accounts "seem[ed] to be inconsistent with the accident airplane's flightpath."<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp In addition, 18 witnesses reported seeing a streak of light that originated at the surface, or the horizon, which did not "appear to be consistent with the airplane's calculated flightpath and other known aspects of the accident sequence."<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Regarding these differing accounts, the NTSB noted that based on their experience in previous investigations "witness reports are often inconsistent with the known facts or with other witnesses' reports of the same events."<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The interviews conducted by the FBI focused on the possibility of a missile attack; suggested interview questions given to FBI agents such as "Where was the sun in relation to the aircraft and the missile launch point?" and "How long did the missile fly?" could have biased interviewees' responses in some cases.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The NTSB concluded that given the large number of witnesses in this case, they "did not expect all of the documented witness observations to be consistent with one another"<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp and "did not view these apparently anomalous witness reports as persuasive evidence that some witnesses might have observed a missile."<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
After missile visibility tests were conducted in April 2000, at Eglin Air Force Base, Fort Walton Beach, Florida,<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp the NTSB determined that if witnesses had observed a missile attack, they would have seen:
- a light from the burning missile motor ascending very rapidly and steeply for about 8 seconds
- the light disappearing for up to 7 seconds
- upon the missile striking the aircraft and igniting the CWT, another light, moving considerably more slowly and more laterally than the first, for about 30 seconds
- this light descending while simultaneously developing into a fireball falling toward the ocean.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp None of the witness documents described such a scenario.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Because of their unique vantage points or the level of precision and detail provided in their accounts, five witness accounts generated special interest:<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp the pilot of Eastwind Airlines Flight 507, the crew members in the HH-60 helicopter, a streak-of-light witness aboard US Airways Flight 217, a land witness on the Beach Lane Bridge in Westhampton Beach, New York and a witness on a boat near Great Gun Beach.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Advocates of a missile-attack scenario asserted that some of these witnesses observed a missile;<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp analysis demonstrated that the observations were not consistent with a missile attack on TWA 800, but instead were consistent with these witnesses having observed part of the in-flight fire and breakup sequence after the CWT explosion.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
The NTSB concluded, "the witness observations of a streak of light were not related to a missile and that the streak of light reported by most of these witnesses was burning fuel from the accident airplane in crippled flight during some portion of the postexplosion, preimpact breakup sequence".<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The NTSB further concluded, "the witnesses' observations of one or more fireballs were of the airplane's burning wreckage falling toward the ocean".<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Possible ignition sources of the center wing fuel tankEdit
To determine what ignited the flammable fuel-air vapor in the CWT and caused the explosion, the NTSB evaluated numerous potential ignition sources. All but one were considered very unlikely to have been the source of ignition.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Missile fragment or small explosive chargeEdit
Although the NTSB had already concluded that a missile strike did not cause the structural failure of the airplane, the possibility that a missile could have exploded close enough to TWA 800 for a missile fragment to have entered the CWT and ignited the fuel/air vapor, yet far enough away not to have left any damage characteristic of a missile strike, was considered.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Computer simulations using missile performance data simulated a missile detonating in a location such that a fragment from the warhead could penetrate the CWT.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Based on these simulations, the NTSB concluded that it was "very unlikely" that a warhead could have detonated in such a location where a fragment could penetrate the CWT without other missile fragments impacting the surrounding airplane structure, leaving distinctive impact marks.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Similarly, the investigation considered the possibility that a small explosive charge placed on the CWT could have been the ignition source.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Testing by the NTSB and the British Defence Evaluation and Research Agency demonstrated that when the metal of the same type and thickness of the CWT was penetrated by a small charge, petalling of the surface occurred where the charge was placed, with pitting on the adjacent surfaces and visible hot-gas washing damage in the surrounding area.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Since none of the recovered CWT wreckage exhibited these damage characteristics and none of the areas of missing wreckage was large enough to encompass all the expected damage, the investigation concluded that this scenario was "very unlikely".<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Other potential sourcesEdit
The NTSB also investigated whether the fuel-air mixture in the CWT could have been ignited by lightning strike, meteor strike, auto ignition or hot surface ignition, a fire migrating to the CWT from another fuel tank via the vent system, an uncontained engine failure, a turbine burst in the air conditioning packs beneath the CWT, a malfunctioning CWT jettison/override pump, a malfunctioning CWT scavenger pump, or static electricity.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp After analysis, the investigation determined that these potential sources were "very unlikely" to have been the source of ignition.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
Fuel quantity indication systemEdit
Because a combustible fuel-air mixture will always exist in fuel tanks, Boeing designers attempted to eliminate all possible sources of ignition in the 747's tanks. To do so, all devices are protected from vapor intrusion, and voltages and currents used by the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) are kept very low. In the case of the 747-100 series, the only wiring located inside the CWT is that associated with the FQIS.Template:Citation needed
For the FQIS to have been Flight 800's ignition source, a transfer of higher-than-normal voltage to the FQIS would have needed to occur, as well as some mechanism whereby the excess energy was released by the FQIS wiring into the CWT. The NTSB concluded, "the ignition energy for the CWT explosion most likely entered the CWT through the FQIS wiring."<ref name="Final Report" />Template:Rp<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>
Though the FQIS itself was designed to prevent danger by minimizing voltages and currents, the innermost tube of Flight 800's FQIS compensator showed damage similar to that of the compensator tube identified as the ignition source for the surge tank fire that destroyed a 747 near Madrid in 1976.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp This was not considered proof of a source of ignition. Evidence of arcing was found in a wire bundle that included FQIS wiring connecting to the center wing tank.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Arcing signs were also seen on two wires sharing a cable raceway with FQIS wiring at station 955.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
The captain's CVR channel showed two "dropouts" of background power harmonics in the second before the recording ended (with the separation of the nose).<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp This might well be the signature of an arc on cockpit wiring adjacent to the FQIS wiring. The captain commented on the "crazy" readings of the number 4 engine fuel flow gauge about 2 1/2 minutes before the CVR recording ended.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Finally, the CWT fuel quantity gauge was recovered and indicated 640 pounds instead of the 300 pounds that had been loaded into that tank.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Experiments showed that applying power to a wire leading to the fuel quantity gauge can cause the digital display to change by several hundred pounds before the circuit breaker trips. Thus, the gauge anomaly could have been caused by a short circuit to the FQIS wiring.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp The NTSB concluded that the most likely source of sufficient voltage to cause ignition was a short circuit from damaged wiring, or within electrical components of the FQIS. As not all components and wiring were recovered, pinpointing the source of the necessary voltage was not possible.
Report conclusionsEdit
The NTSB investigation ended with the adoption of the board's final report on August 23, 2000. The board determined that the probable cause of the TWA 800 accident was:<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />
[An] explosion of the center wing fuel tank (CWT), resulting from ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in the tank. The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be determined with certainty, but, of the sources evaluated by the investigation, the most likely was a short circuit outside of the CWT that allowed excessive voltage to enter it through electrical wiring associated with the fuel quantity indication system.{{#if:|{{#if:|}}
— {{#if:|, in }}Template:Comma separated entries}}
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In addition to the probable cause, the NTSB found the following contributing factors to the accident:<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp
<templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" />
- The design and certification concept that fuel tank explosions could be prevented solely by precluding all ignition sources.
- The certification of the Boeing 747 with heat sources located beneath the CWT with no means to reduce the heat transferred into the CWT or to render the fuel tank vapor noncombustible{{#if:|{{#if:|}}
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During the course of its investigation, and in its final report, the NTSB issued 15 safety recommendations, mostly covering fuel tank and wiring-related issues.<ref name="Final Report"/>Template:Rp Among the recommendations was that significant consideration should be given to the development of modifications such as nitrogen-inerting systems for new airplane designs, and where feasible, for existing airplanes.<ref name="A-96-174-177">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Rp
ControversyEdit
Template:See also After the accident, former Joint Chief of Staff Thomas Moorer and former White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger speculated that the airplane was destroyed by a missile, with a nearby U.S. Navy ship being the likely culprit.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The NTSB's conclusions about the cause of the TWA 800 disaster took four years and one month to be published. The FBI's earliest investigations and interviews, later used by the NTSB, were performed under the assumption of a missile attack, a fact noted in the NTSB's final report. Six months into the investigation, the NTSB's chairman, Jim Hall, was quoted as saying, "All three theories—a bomb, a missile, or mechanical failure—remain."<ref name="cnn01172007">Template:Cite news</ref> Speculation was fueled in part by early descriptions, visuals, and eyewitness accounts of the disaster that indicated a sudden explosion and trails of fire moving in an upward direction.
On June 19, 2013, the NTSB acknowledged in a press release that they received a petition for reconsideration of the investigation into the July 17, 1996, crash of TWA Flight 800.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> In 2014, the NTSB declined the petition to reopen the investigation.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> In a press release, the NTSB stated: "After a thorough review of all the information provided by the petitioners, the NTSB denied the petition in its entirety because the evidence and analysis presented did not show the original findings were incorrect."<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
AftermathEdit
Many internet users responded to the incident; the resulting web traffic set records for internet activity at the time. CNN's traffic quadrupled to 3.9 million views per day. The website of The New York Times had its traffic increase to 1.5 million views per day, 50% higher than its previous rate. In 1996, few U.S. government websites were updated daily, but the United States Navy's crash website was constantly updated and had detailed information about the salvage of the crash site.<ref>Barboza, David. "Many Hits, Some Misses: The Post-Crash Web Rush Template:Webarchive." The New York Times. August 6, 1996. Retrieved on June 5, 2009.</ref>
The wreckage was moved to an NTSB facility in Ashburn, Virginia, that was custom-built for the purpose.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> The reconstructed aircraft was used to train accident investigators until it was decommissioned in 2021.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
On July 18, 2008, the United States Secretary of Transportation Mary E. Peters visited the facility and announced a final rule designed to prevent accidents caused by fuel-tank explosions. The rule required airlines to pump inert gas into the tanks. The rule covered the CWT on all new passenger and cargo airliners, and passenger planes built in most of the 1990s, but not on old cargo planes.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref> The NTSB had first recommended such a rule just five months after the incident and 33 years after a similar recommendation issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board Bureau of Safety on December 17, 1963, nine days after the crash of Pan Am Flight 214.<ref name="cab">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
The crash of TWA Flight 800, and that of ValuJet Flight 592 earlier in 1996, prompted Congress to pass the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996 as part of the federal aviation appropriations bill. Among other things, the act gives NTSB, instead of the particular airline involved, responsibility for coordinating services to the families of victims of fatal aircraft accidents in the United States. In addition, it restricts lawyers and other parties from contacting family members within 30 days of the accident.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
During the investigation, the NTSB and the FBI clashed with each other. The agencies lacked a detailed protocol describing which agency should take the lead when whether an event was an accident or a criminal act was initially unclear. At the time of the crash, 49 CFR 831.5 specified that the NTSB's aviation accident investigations have priority over all other federal investigations.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> After the TWA flight 800 investigation, the NTSB recognized the need for better clarity. Template:Citation needed span to clarify the issue in 49 USC 1131(a)(2)(B), which was amended in 2000 to read: Template:Quote box In 2005, the NTSB and the FBI entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that stated that, "[i]n the immediate aftermath of a transportation accident, the NTSB is the presumptive lead investigative agency and will assume control of the accident scene." The FBI may still conduct a criminal investigation, but the NTSB investigation has priority. When investigative priority remains with the NTSB, the FBI must coordinate its investigative activities with the NTSB investigator-in-charge. This authority includes interviewing witnesses. The MOU states that: "[t]his procedure is intended…to ensure that neither NTSB nor FBI investigative activity unnecessarily complicates or compromises the other agency's investigation." The new statutory language and the MOU have improved coordination between the NTSB and FBI since the TWA Flight 800 accident. Template:As of, NTSB and FBI personnel conduct joint exercises. Each agency can call upon the other's laboratories and other assets. The NTSB and the FBI have designated liaisons to ensure that information flows between agencies and to coordinate on-scene operations.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>Template:Primary source inline
Heidi Snow, the fiancée of Flight 800 victim Michel Breistroff, established the AirCraft Casualty Emotional Support Services nonprofit group together with families of victims of Pan Am Flight 103.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
MemorialsEdit
The TWA Flight 800 International Memorial was dedicated in a Template:Convert parcel immediately adjoining the main pavilion at Smith Point County Park in Shirley, New York, on July 14, 2002. Funds for the memorial were raised by the Families of TWA Flight 800 Association. The memorial includes landscaped grounds, flags from the 13 countries of the victims, and a curved black granite memorial with the names engraved on one side and an illustration on the other of a wave releasing 230 seagulls. In July 2006, an abstract black granite statue of a Template:Convert lighthouse was added above a tomb holding many of the victims' personal belongings. The lighthouse statue was designed by Harry Edward Seaman, whose cousin died in the crash, and dedicated by George Pataki.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref>
Destruction of wreckageEdit
For almost 25 years, the wreckage of Flight 800 was kept by the NTSB and used as an accident-investigation teaching aid. By 2021, the methods taught using the wreckage were determined to no longer be relevant to modern accident investigation, which by then relied heavily on new technology, including three-dimensional laser-scanning techniques.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
As the NTSB did not wish to renew the lease for the hangar in which it had stored the reassembled accident debris, it decommissioned the wreckage in July 2021.<ref name="aratani20210716">Template:Cite news</ref> As the NTSB had agreements with the victims' families that the wreckage cannot be used in any kind of public memorial or be scuttled in the ocean, it plans to scan each piece of debris with a three-dimensional laser scanner, with the data being permanently archived, after which the wreckage will be destroyed and the metal recycled. Any parts of the plane that cannot be recycled will be disposed of in landfills.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref><ref name="decomission">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> Destruction of the wreckage was scheduled for completion before the end of 2021.<ref name=aratani20210716/> The wreckage was destroyed in June 2023 near the former Ashburn facility in which it was housed.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
DramatizationEdit
The incident was reenacted in season 17, episode 4 of Mayday, titled "Explosive Proof"
On July 17, 2013, the 17th anniversary of the tragedy, the Epix premium TV channel aired the documentary TWA Flight 800, directed by Kristina Borjesson, which alleges that the crash investigation was a cover-up. The film highlights extensive eyewitness interviews, with many interviewees directly objecting to publicly described versions of their own descriptions of events. It also highlights interviews with investigators who had been involved in the original inquest, six of whom had filed a petition to reopen the probe. Their petition was based on eyewitness accounts, radar evidence indicating a possible missile and claims of evidence tampering. They dubbed it "The TWA 800 Project". Former NTSB investigator Henry Hughes has been quoted that he believes a bomb or a missile caused the crash.<ref name="U.S. investigators will not reopen TWA Flight 800 crash probe">Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref name="ntsb.gov">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>
The crash of fictional Volée Airlines Flight 180 in the first season and 5 of the Final Destination series is also said to be inspired by the crash.
See alsoEdit
- Boeing 747 hull losses
- Louis Freeh – director of the FBI from 1993 to 2001 who assisted in the crash investigation
- Night Fall – 2004 New York Times bestseller by novelist Nelson DeMille that revolves around a couple who witnessed and videotaped the crash of TWA Flight 800
- Pan Am Flight 214 – an aircraft that suffered a fuel-tank explosion in midair in 1963 after being hit by lightning
- Philippine Airlines Flight 143 – a similar incident in 1990 involving a 737 that experienced a fuel-tank explosion on the ground, possibly caused by faulty wiring
- Thai Airways International Flight 114 - a similar incident in 2001 involving a 737 that experienced a fuel-tank explosion on the ground, possibly as a result of running the pump in the presence of metal shavings and a fuel/air mixture
- South African Airways Flight 295 – another Boeing 747 crash giving rise to conspiracy theories
ReferencesEdit
Template:NTSB Template:Reflist
External linksEdit
Template:Sister project Template:Sister project Template:External media
- National Transportation Safety Board
- NTSB Aircraft Accident Report
- NTSB Aircraft Accident Report Appendices
- TWA 800 Board Meeting (Archive)
- Report by John Barry Smith (Archive), posted on NTSB website
- CIA analysis of witness observations Template:Webarchive
- Flight 800: United States Navy
- Trans World Airlines Flight 800: Federal Bureau of Investigation New York Field Office (Archive)
- Boeing Statement Following the First Day of the NTSB's Flight 800 Sunshine Meeting (Archive) – Boeing
- Learning from a Tragedy: Explosions and Flight 800
- CNN portal: TWA Flight 800
- "Passenger List: TWA Flight 800". The Washington Post.
- Template:YouTube
- Template:Skeptoid
Template:Aviation accidents and incidents in 1996 Template:Aviation accidents and incidents in the United States in the 1990s Template:Trans World Airlines Template:Portal bar Template:Authority control